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          The literature proposes that bipolar systems and international systems with nuclear 
weapons will not have significant issues with alliance pathologies. But are alliance 
pathologies really insignificant in Bipolar Systems? The problem is that the literature 
only describes bipolar systems with nuclear weapons, so one cannot discern whether 
bipolarity or nuclear weapons alone are responsible for the insignificance of these 
alliance pathologies. So to solve this problem, this paper will examine a bipolar system in 
Classical Greece during the time of the Peloponnesian War to isolate any possible 
influence that nuclear weapons may have on alliance pathologies. This will be done using 
qualitative analysis in the form of an in-depth case study to focus on a total of six allies 
from the two superpowers – Athens and Sparta. The findings show that alliance 
pathologies significantly impact alliances in bipolar systems, which better clarifies the 
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          This paper seeks to provide a deeper understanding of how Alliance Pathologies 
(adverse ally behaviors) relate to the International Distribution of Power (the number of 
great powers) and Nuclear Weapons. So what are Alliance Pathologies? They are 
behaviors conducted by allies out of their own self-interest that ultimately jeopardizes the 
overall security of their alliance. Some of these behaviors include: chain-ganging 
(aggressor dragging its alliance into war), buck-passing (not fulfilling ones 
commitments), entrapment (being pulled into a war for an ally’s interests), and 
abandonment (defection) (Christensen and Snyder 1990; Snyder 1984). This study will 
help establish a framework for scholars and policymakers to predict how these 
pathologies will impact their alliance partners. The current theory holds that Alliance 
Pathologies will have a significant impact on alliances in Multipolar Systems – an 
International Distribution of Power concentrated across at least three great powers 
(Christensen and Snyder 1990; Snyder 1984; Waltz 1979, 144). The theory also 
maintains that the effects of Alliance Pathologies are not significant in Bipolar Systems – 
a Distribution of Power concentrated across only two superpowers (Christensen and 
Snyder 1990; Snyder 1984; Waltz 1979). However, the literature has not taken into 
account that the Bipolar System discussed in the literature also contains Nuclear 
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Weapons. So the problem becomes figuring out which condition nuclear weapons or 
bipolarity determines the insignificance of these pathologies.     
          This leads me to my research question which is: Are alliance pathologies really 
insignificant to alliances in Bipolar Systems?  Or is there something else driving this 
outcome? I am inclined to think that nuclear weapons may play a pivotal role here and 
not necessarily bipolar nature of the system as described. So in order to find out, I will 
explore a bipolar system free from nuclear weapons and their influence. By isolating the 
two variables nuclear weapons and bipolarity, I can implement the scientific control 
needed to determine which variable is responsible for this outcome. The difficult part 
becomes choosing a suitable worldwide bipolar system without nuclear weapons. 
However this can be resolved by substituting a worldwide bipolar system for one at the 
regional level, in which two great powers dominate the political landscape. So for 
instance I decided to set up a case study in Classical Greece during the Peloponnesian 
Wars, when Athens and Sparta were considered the two most powerful city-states within 
their sphere of influence. First, I will analyze the six most important allies of Athens and 
Sparta to see if any alliance pathologies can be observed. If pathologies are present I will 
then determine their impact on Athens and Sparta and in turn the bipolar system as a 
whole.  
          When completed this study will provide a clearer picture of how the international 
distribution of power, namely bipolar systems, factor into the significance of alliance 
pathologies. If this study affirms the current theory’s prediction – that alliance 
pathologies are not significant in Bipolar Systems. Then, there will be no doubt that 
nuclear weapons could have been involved in any way, since nuclear weapons did not 
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exist at the time of Classical Greece. However, if this study shows that alliance 
pathologies do significantly impact alliances in this bipolar system. Then, it may suggest 
that nuclear weapons could have been responsible for the lack of significant alliance 
pathologies in the bipolar system referred to in the literature. This would indicate that 
more research needs to be invested into learning how nuclear weapons influence alliance 
pathologies, so that scholars and policymakers alike can make more reliable predictions 
on the topic.   
          So why does this matter? Around the world today many countries seek to obtain 
nuclear weapons. Despite the persistent effort of the international community to curtail 
the spread of nuclear weapons through the United Nations’ 1968, ‘Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’ (NPT) and the 1996, ‘Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty’ (CTBT) some countries like India, Pakistan, and perhaps even North Korea 
still managed to have acquired some form of the capability 
(http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml; 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/CTBT/). This begs the question could the 
same alliance pathologies that have plagued other alliances have the same effect on 
alliances with nuclear powers. In other words could an ally like North Korea chain-gang 
China into a nuclear war with the United States, if North Korea decides to launch a 
nuclear assault on either South Korea or the United States? I think this it would be highly 
unlikely, since I do not think China would purposely risk so much over the interests of an 
ally. This is why I believe that nuclear weapons may play a role in deciding the 
significance of alliance pathologies and not necessarily the system’s international 
distribution of power.  
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          Currently, however, this nuclear dimension of alliance pathologies has not been 
thoroughly explored. Glenn Snyder has made some progress, but he exclusively focused 
on how alliance pathologies conducted by nuclear powers would influence minor allies 
and not the other way around (1984). Snyder (1984) writes “To Europe nuclear 
abandonment means either a withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear deterrent or an evaporation 
of its credibility. Nuclear entrapment means the actual use of nuclear weapons in case 
deterrence fails, especially in a way that makes Europe the principal battleground” (492). 
While this suggests that alliance pathologies could occur when nuclear weapons are 
present, it does not suggest that they will have any significant impact on the alliance as a 
whole. And once again this discussion centers on nuclear weapons and alliance 
pathologies that are set in a bipolar system, an international distribution of power that 
Glenn Snyder himself concedes to having less problems with alliance pathologies 
(Snyder 1990).     
          This thesis will advance the study of alliance pathologies by determining the 
veracity of the literature’s claim that alliance pathologies are not significant in bipolar 
systems. This will also be the first time that anyone has scrutinized alliance pathologies 
in a bipolar system, isolated from nuclear weapons. At the same time this type of control 
will help one to recognize how influential nuclear weapons are on alliance pathologies. 
So the results will provide a fresh look at how alliance pathologies respond to the new 











Section A: Alliance Pathologies 
        In the International Relations literature there are two major themes concerning 
alliance pathologies. The first, alliance security dilemma, explains how countries form 
and manage alliances. This literature introduces the alliance pathologies of abandonment 
and entrapment.  
          The other theme explains how the, offensive/defensive advantage, influences the 
behavior of states involved in alliances. This approach introduces the notions of chain-
ganging and buck-passing by examining how states perceive military advantages given 
conditions within the International System.  
Alliance Security Dilemma 
         The alliance dilemma approach examines how alliances are formed and managed. 
Snyder (1984) writes, “The security dilemma in the alliance game has two phases: 
primary and secondary. The primary phase occurs during the process of alliance 
formation, the secondary one after alliances have formed” (462). The second phase of the 
alliance dilemma examines how firmly and readily an ally will commit itself to its 
alliance partners and support them in war. Snyder (1984) argues, “In the alliance security 
dilemma, the principal ‘bads’ are ‘abandonment’ and ‘entrapment,’ and the principal 
‘goods’ are a reduction in the risks of being abandoned or entrapped by the ally” (466). 
Abandonment - is when a country defects, realigns, or fails to maintain its commitments 
to the alliance (Snyder 1984; Snyder 1997). An ally that abandons its alliance reduces the 
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resources of the alliance which weakens it and requires other alliance member to provide 
additional support to maintain the alliance’s security. Entrapment occurs when states are 
‘dragged into a conflict over an ally’s interests that one does not share, or shares only 
partially’ (Snyder 1984, 467). Entrapment takes place when allies wish to maintain the 
security of the alliance more than they are willing to allow the destruction of their ally.  
          An ally will choose abandonment or entrapment after estimating the trade-offs 
among the risks, benefits, and costs associated with the decision (Snyder 1984). 
However, the principal determinants are a combination of these factors – direct and 
indirect dependence, explicitness of commitment, disparity of interests in conflict with 
the opponent, and the behavioral record (Snyder 1984, 475). Proximate determinants such 
as strategic choice are also associated with the primary factors when determining alliance 
behaviors. Nevertheless, “If a state perceives its ally as less dependent, if the alliance 
commitment is vague, and if the ally’s recent behavior suggests doubtful loyalty, the state 
will fear abandonment” (Snyder 1984, 475). In addition, Snyder (1984) wrote “The 
greater one’s dependence on the alliance and the stronger one’s commitment to the ally, 
the higher the risk of entrapment” (467). Alliance behaviors within the alliance dilemma 
viewpoint originate from the interplay between these trade-offs.   
Offensive/Defensive Advantage 
          The theme Offensive/Defensive Advantage describes how aligned countries 
perceive one another. A country that begins to perceive itself as having either an 
Offensive or Defensive Advantage in relation to an opponent behaves in a distinctive 
manner. Traditionally Quester (1977), writes that “offenses produce war and/or empire; 
defenses support independence and peace” (208). However, currently the perception of 
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‘offensive advantage’ represents the alliance behavior of ‘chain-ganging.’ Christensen 
and Snyder argue that ‘chain-ganging’ occurs when a country perceives itself as having 
an overwhelming ‘offensive military advantage’ over its adversary (1990). Chain-
ganging - is when an aggressive country drags its entire alliance into war (Christensen 
and Snyder 1990). An example of a chain-ganging would be Austria at the beginning of 
the First World War. Austria’s aggression into Serbia dragged its alliance members 
(Central Powers) into war. 
          Conversely the perception of ‘defensive advantage’ is realized as ‘buck-passing.’ 
Buck-passing arises from a state’s perception that it has the ‘defensive advantage’ and 
that it would be better off ‘passing the costs’ of the alliance off to other alliance members 
(Christensen and Snyder 1990). Buck-passing - is when a country does nothing, while 
other countries contribute resources to the alliance (Christensen and Snyder 1990). An 
example of a buck-passing would be Great Britain, at the beginning of the Second World 
War. Great Britain provided little assistance to its allies, because it felt protected by the 
English Channel. 
          The alliance behaviors chain-ganging or buck-passing will occur if countries 
perceive themselves more favorably offensively or defensively. So what factors go into 
determining how a country perceives itself? Christensen & Snyder (1990) write, “The 
soldiers’ and policymakers’ perceptions of international structural incentives, including 
the offense-defense balance, are shaped by their formative experiences, especially in the 
last major war” (145). “If leaders believe offensive military doctrines to be efficacious, 
the likelihood of chain-gangs and quick escalation is high, while if they believe that 
defenses are hardy, they will try to pass the costs of opposing challengers onto other 
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actors” (Christensen 1997, 67). In addition, the decision makers’ past experiences and 
prior military strategies must also be considered against the country’s military 
capabilities. Jervis (1978) argues, “Technology and geography are the two main factors 
that determine whether the offense or the defense has the advantage” (194). Therefore, a 
country’s perceptions are based on the decision makers’ strategies and experiences 
coupled with the country’s military capability.  
Offensive Advantage and Chain-ganging    
          A country determines it has an offensive advantage, by combining the 
‘perceptions’ of decision makers and the degree of the country’s ‘vulnerabilities’ to other 
countries. Christensen and Snyder (1990) explain, “The greater the vulnerability of states 
(that is, the more favorable the technology or geography for the attacker), the greater is 
the propensity to align unconditionally and to fight all-out in defense of an ally from the 
first moment it is attacked” (144). In other words, weaker countries would be highly 
vulnerable if the chain-ganger (the aggressor) gets destroyed, so they remained aligned 
with the attacker. The degree of vulnerability and the perception of the country’s 
geographical and technological propensity also factors in before alliance members are 
pulled into war by the chain-ganger.  
Defensive Advantage and Buck-passing  
           The decision to buck-pass is very similar to that of chain-ganging. A buck-passing 
country considers itself ‘less vulnerable’ to other countries. This view of being stronger is 
combined with the decision makers’ perspective of military advantage. Christensen and 
Snyder (1990) write, “The lesser the vulnerability of states, the greater is the tendency to 
pass the buck” (145). Jervis explains that “the defensive and deterrent military 
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technologies, as well as geographical configuration make conquest more difficult” (Jervis 
as cited in Christensen and Snyder 1990, 144). Since the buck-passer is ‘less vulnerable’ 
and has a strong defensive position, it is not in much danger. Therefore the buck-passer 
reduces its contributions to the alliance, which weakens the alliance and makes the allies 
contribute more for their safety.  
Similarities between the Two Themes 
Chain-Ganging & Entrapment 
          The alliance pathologies chain-ganging and entrapment are very similar. Both of 
these types of alliance pathologies focus on the offensive actions of allies. Chain-ganging 
- is the term given to a ‘state that drags its alliance partners into an unwanted war’ 
(Christensen and Snyder 1990). Even though alliance members do not wish to enter a 
conflict initiated by their aggressive ally, the ‘destruction of the chain-ganging state 
would cripple the security of the alliance,’ so the alliance is compelled to act (Christensen 
and Snyder 1990). Entrapment - is when a country is dragged into a conflict over an 
ally’s interests (Snyder 1984; Snyder 1997). Entrapment is similar to chain-ganging 
except that the entrapped states are not the aggressors starting the conflict. But both 
chain-ganging and entrapment pull alliance members into unwanted wars due to 
offensive actions.  
Buck-Passing & Abandonment 
          Likewise buck-passing and abandonment are alliance pathologies that relate to the 
allies’ defensive actions. Buck-passing occurs when a state free-rides, while other states 
suffer the burden of providing excess security in the effort to balance threats (Christensen 
and Snyder 1990; Christensen 1997; Walt 1987). Abandonment - is when a country 
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defects, realigns, or fails to maintain its commitments to the alliance (Snyder 1984; 
Snyder 1997). Abandonment is similar to buck-passing, but unlike buck-passing, 
abandonment clarifies the importance of ‘defection’ from alliances. Both buck-passing 
and abandonment are examples of states optimizing their own defensive advantage at the 
expense of their alliance and its members.   
 
Section B: International System and Alliance Pathologies  
International Structure (Distribution of Power)  
          According to the balance-of-power theory, countries form alliances to confront 
other powerful countries and their alliances (Waltz 1979). The ‘balance-of-power’ 
reveals the ‘distribution of power’ within the international system (Waltz 1979; Walt 
1987; Mearsheimer 1994). ‘The distribution of power’ in a bipolar system reflects the 
concentration of capabilities across two of the system’s units (Waltz 1979, 144). The 
United States and the Soviet Union from 1947-1991 during the Cold War is an example 
of a bipolar system. A multipolar system is a concentration of capabilities across more 
than two system units. The great powers during the First World War and the beginning of 
the Second World War represent multipolar systems. Countries in both multipolar and 
bipolar systems strive to build up their capabilities to protect themselves against external 
threats. Walt (1988) writes, “When faced with a clear external threat, these states almost 
always sought to counter the threat through some combination of external alignment and 
internal effort” (308). “States may balance externally, by combining their capabilities 
with others, or they may balance internally, by mobilizing their own resources in ways 
that will enable them to resist stronger states more effectively. Or they may do both” 
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(Walt 2005, 120). According to the literature internal and external balancing correlates 
with a particular distribution of power. Mearsheimer (1990) writes, “Under multipolarity 
states tend to balance by external means; under bipolarity they are compelled to use 
internal means” (17). These different balancing techniques and their corresponding 
international systems are thought to dramatically influence the nature of alliance 
pathologies. 
External Balancing 
           Waltz (1981) writes, “In the old days weaker powers could improve their positions 
through alliances by adding the strength of foreign armies to their own” (3). Waltz (1979) 
also explains, “External efforts, moves to strengthen and enlarge one’s own alliance or to 
weaken and shrink an opposing one” (118). External balancing pools resources and other 
capabilities together quickly, which is difficult if not impossible for some countries. 
Some countries lack the required resources and technology to develop the sophisticated 
weaponry needed to protect themselves from aggressors. While other countries may have 
the resources and know-how, but they may not have the time to develop the weaponry in 
a timely fashion. For these countries “External balancing of this sort is especially 
attractive because it is cheap and fast” (Mearsheimer 1990, 19). Mearsheimer (2001) 
writes, “Recruiting allies increases the amount of firepower confronting the aggressor, 
which in turn increases the likelihood that deterrence will work” (156).  
Association with Multipolarity 
          Multipolar systems primarily use external balancing techniques to obtain 
resources, unlike bipolar systems. Nevertheless, “In most multipolar systems, both forms 
of balancing are possible” (Pape 2005, 15). The international system is anarchic, 
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meaning there is no governing authority in world politics above countries, i.e. there is no 
world government (Waltz 1979). So states pursue relative and absolute gains in the 
international system to better their position and provide for their security. “States seek to 
survive under anarchy by maximizing their power relative to other states, in order to 
maintain the means for self-defense” (Mearsheimer 1990, 12). Or Mearsheimer (1994) 
writes, “They can think in terms of absolute gains, which means each side focuses on 
maximizing its own profit, and cares little about how much the other side gains or losses 
in the deal” (12). However, Waltz (1979) argues, “Relative gains may be more important 
than absolute ones because one’s gain measured against that of others affects the ability 
to shift oneself” (134). Therefore, states form alliances by external balancing achieve 
greater relative gains improve their position and security in the international system.  
          External balancing is more prevalent in multipolar systems, since there is higher 
percentage of international capabilities spread more evenly throughout the world. As the 
system’s capabilities are spread across three or more countries the proportion of their 
capabilities move closer together. With capabilities in the international system 
approaching equality, alliances stand to gain significant resources from the relative gains 
of other states. Waltz (1979) writes, “Similarly, with a number of approximately equal 
states, strategy is at least partly made for the sake of attracting and holding allies” (165). 
“Flexibility of alignment then makes for rigidity in national strategies: a state’s strategy 
must satisfy its partner lest that partner defect from the alliance” (Waltz 1967, 218). 
Moreover, since the capabilities of countries are approximately equal, their reliance on 
alliance partners intensifies. “In alliances among equals, the defection of one party 
threatens the security of the others” (Waltz 1979, 168). Waltz explains that the reliance 
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on alliance partners makes them extremely ‘interdependent’ on each other (1979). This 
interdependence makes alliance members susceptible to the dangers of alliance 
pathologies putting alliances and their member states in danger.  
          Figure 1, illustrates the multipolar system’s capabilities during 1914. This graph 
represents the percentage of capabilities from each of the great powers and all of the 
lesser powers, which are grouped together in the ‘other states’ category. Clearly, many of 
the great powers’ capabilities are approximately equal to one another. States that balance 
externally, especially in multipolar systems, rely heavily on their alliance partners. This 
reliance on other states increases the likelihood that alliance pathologies will occur. 
Germany had no choice but to follow the chain-ganger Austro-Hungary into war, since its 
destruction would have seriously weakened the central powers. Moreover, Russian buck-
passing in the later stages of the war seriously reduced the alliance’s capabilities for the 
United Kingdom and France.  The data generated for this graph is provided by the 
EUGene software tool (http://www.eugenesoftware.org/). EUGene uses the capability 
score from the ‘Correlates of War CINC score,’ which measures capability by ‘summing 
all observations on each of the six capability components for a given year, converting 
each state's absolute component to a share of the international system, and then averaging 




 Expected Pathologies 
          States relying on external means for security will be affected more by alliance 
pathologies than states relying on internal means. By losing the contribution of some 
allies, the overall security of all alliance members is put into jeopardy as contributions 
decrease from lost members of the alliance (Waltz 1979). Therefore chain-ganging and 
buck-passing pose serious consequences to states that rely on external balancing 
techniques. Christensen & Snyder (1990) write, “Any nation that marches to war 
inexorably drags its alliance partners with it” (140). This example of chain-ganging 
illustrates how alliance partners will act in unusual ways in order to preserve the strength 
of their alliance.     
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          The ambiguity within the international system attributed to external balancing 
bolsters alliance pathologies even more. External balancing also makes it very difficult 
for countries and alliances to estimate one another’s strength, since strength is derived 
from a hodgepodge of resources it is likely to be misinterpreted. Waltz (1981) writes, 
“Miscalculation causes wars. One side expects victory at an affordable price, while the 
other side hopes to avoid defeat” (6). He explains that states in a multipolar world are 
‘tempted to act on advantages that are wishfully discerned and narrowly calculated’ 
(Waltz 1981). The ambiguity of how countries and alliances perceive offensive/defensive 
advantages with external balancing increases the likelihood that alliance pathologies will 
occur whenever external balancing dominates. According to the international relations 
literature external balancing is most prevalent in multipolar system. Therefore alliance 
pathologies are believed to take place more frequently in multipolar systems.  
Internal Balancing  
         Internal balancing differs from external balancing in how countries seek to obtain 
their capabilities. Waltz (1979) explains, “Internal efforts, moves to increase economic 
capability, to increase military strength, and to develop clever strategies” (118). Countries 
choose internal balancing techniques in order to increase their own capabilities without 
using as much foreign assistance. This decreases ones dependence on foreign powers and 
alliances. However in order for a country to balance internally, it must already possess a 
significant portion of the distribution of power. In other words, the country must already 





Association with Bipolarity 
          Internal balancing primarily exists in bipolar systems. “In a two-power system the 
politics of balance continue, but the way to compensate for an incipient external 
disequilibrium is primarily by intensifying one’s internal efforts” (Waltz 1979, 118). 
This is largely attributed to the nature of a bipolar system, in which two countries hold 
the largest concentration of capabilities in the system. As fewer countries control a 
greater proportion of the international system’s capabilities, the proportion of the 
capabilities moves farther apart. (This can be illustrated by comparing Figure 1 with 
Figure 2.) This creates greater inequality among the countries in bipolar systems. Waltz 
(1979) argues, “In alliances among unequals, the contributions of the lesser members are 
at once wanted and of relatively small importance” (168). In other words bipolar 
superpowers stand to gain very little, in terms of relative strength from alliances with 
minor powers. Regardless of this superpowers in bipolar systems do form alliances with 
minor powers.    
This diplomatic maneuver, which is often called external balancing, is limited in 
a bipolar world, because there are no potential great-power alliance partners, 
although it is still possible to ally with minor powers. During the Cold War, for 
example, both the United States and the Soviet Union had no choice but to ally 
with minor powers, because they were the only great powers in the system. 




         Waltz (1979) argues, “The contributions [from allies] are useful even in a bipolar 
world, but they are not indispensible (169). Unlike multipolar systems in which countries 
are highly interdependent on each other, countries in bipolar systems are less 
interdependent. “Military interdependence varies with the extent to which, and the 
equality with which, great powers rely on others for their security” (Waltz 1979, 168). 
Since bipolar superpowers do not rely heavily on other countries for their security, 
military interdependence is low. Low interdependence of alliance partners decreases the 
influence of alliance pathologies in bipolar systems.      
Expected Pathologies 
         Clearly states that do not rely heavily on other states and alliances for their security 
will not be as affected by alliance pathologies as states that do. In fact Christensen & 
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Snyder (1990) argue that bipolar superpowers rely primarily on internal balancing, so 
losing peripheral allies is irrelevant (142). It is not that alliance pathologies do not occur 
when states balance internally, but if they do, they would be inconsequential to the 
security of the alliance. “Bipolar superpowers do not need to chain themselves to small 
reckless allies, since the superpowers are not dependent on allies for their survival” 
(Christensen and Snyder 1990, 141). A superpower’s security is gained from its own 
resources, so it’s not threatened if a country decides to defect from an alliance. Internal 
balancing provides security, while at the same time creating a buffer to adverse alliance 
pathologies.   
          Moreover, internal balancing makes it easier for opposing coalitions to gauge the 
resources and capabilities of their adversaries, which reduces the miscalculations that 
produce wars. Waltz explains that this is possible since ‘internal balancing is more 
reliable and precise than external balancing’ (1979). “States are less likely to misjudge 
their relative strengths than they are to misjudge the strength and reliability of opposing 
coalitions” (Waltz 1981, 2). The conditions that influence minor powers into perceiving 
offensive/defensive advantage over others would be kept at a minimum. Therefore 
internal balancing mitigates the effects that alliance pathologies have on superpowers, 
since there is more clarity of opposing strengths.  
          Finally, the relative difference between the capabilities of countries in a bipolar 
system also factor in to the lack of alliance pathologies. Waltz (1967) argues, “The gross 
inequality between the two superpowers and the members of their respective alliances 
make any realignment of the latter fairly insignificant” (219). Waltz (1979) writes, “Third 
parties [in bipolar systems] are not able to tilt the balance of power by withdrawing from 
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one alliance or by joining the other” (169). The relative contributions of minor powers 
are considered too small to alter bipolar systems. Whereas minor powers in multipolar 
systems are consistently sought to do just that, tilt the balance of power in favor of one 
pole over the other.  
 
Section C: Nuclear Weapons and Alliance Pathologies  
Nuclear Weapons and the International System 
          How has the introduction of nuclear weapons affected the distribution of power in 
the international system? Since the distribution of power reflects how power capabilities 
are amassed between countries in the international system, the question really centers on 
whether or not nuclear weapons change how capabilities are redistributed within the 
system. According to Weber nuclear weapons have NOT significantly altered the 
distribution of capabilities among states (1990, 62). The possession of nuclear weapons 
alone does not make a state a great power. Waltz (1979) writes, “Great powers are strong 
not simply because they have nuclear weapons but also because of their immense 
resources enable them to generate and maintain power of all types, military and other, at 
strategic and tactical levels” (183). Even though nuclear weapons have not affected the 
distribution of power in the international system, they have affected the internal/external 
balancing techniques between states. Walt explains that weak states can resist the United 
States through three internal balancing techniques: increasing conventional military 
resources, using terrorism, or acquiring weapons of mass destruction, in order to resist the 
conventional military power of the United States (2005). “As these statements reveal, 
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weaker states are aware that a WMD arsenal can offset some – though of course not all – 
of the advantages that stronger states would otherwise possess” (Walt 2005, 139).  
Are Nuclear Weapons an Absolute Gain/Weapon? 
          Generally states in the international system seek relative gains when they balance 
externally or internally. Nuclear weapons are indeed an internal means of balancing, but 
they do not increase gains relatively but absolutely. Once the requirements are met and a 
country possesses a nuclear capability, there is no value added from relative gains. 
Levels of absolute capability are now more important than relative power because 
with nuclear weapons, what is crucial is each side’s ability to cripple the other, 
and this capability is measured by the match between the country’s forces and the 
targets it seeks to destroy, not between the two side’s forces. (Jervis 1989, 47) 
 
The absolute quality of nuclear weapons makes it possible for weak states to stand up to 
strong states. Waltz (1990) writes, “Nuclear weapons have reversed the fates of strong 
and weak states” (744). Mearsheimer (1990) argues, “Nuclear weapons affect the degree 
of equality in the system. Specifically, the situation created by MAD bolsters peace by 
moving power relations among states toward equality” (20).This puts all owners of 
nuclear weapons on an equal footing, and all non-owners on an unequal footing in their 
relationship with nuclear powers.     
Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence 
          Before the advent of nuclear weapons, countries had to deter potential aggressors 
with the relative increases made by external or internal balancing. Waltz (1990) claims, 
“Deterrence depends on what one can do, not on what one will do” (733). “A nonnuclear 
alliance provides the public good of deterrence through the political use of conventional 
weapons, that is, by threatening costly military retaliation to an undesired action by the 
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adversary” (Palmer & Sky 1999, 756). Now nuclear powers can easily deter aggressors 
by threatening to use their nuclear arsenal on aggressors. In fact Walt (2005) argues, 
“Weapons of mass destruction – and especially nuclear weapons – are extremely 
effective instruments of basic deterrence, because it is too dangerous to threaten a WMD-
owning state with conquest or ‘regime change’” (139). Nuclear weapons provide their 
owners an absolute gain in the quality of deterrence, which will not disappear when the 
distribution of power shifts and/or their position in the system changes from great power 
to minor power. This gives nuclear states positive assurance that they will maintain their 
security simply by having a nuclear deterrent.      
          Nuclear deterrence creates another phenomenon known as Mutual Assured 
Destruction (MAD). Mutual Assured Destruction is a form of deterrence arising from the 
consequences of what would happen if at least two nuclear powers would use nuclear 
weapons on each other. Jervis (1982) argues, “Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) 
escapes from the security dilemma as each side gains security not from its ability to 
protect itself, but from its ability to retaliate and so to deter the other from launching an 
attack” (374). Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) influences how nuclear powers 
behave in the international system by inhibiting them from rash actions. Brodie (1947) 
writes, “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. 
From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them” (76). The devastating effects of 
nuclear weapons along with the possibility of MAD, restrains nuclear powers from 
engaging in frivolous activities on behalf of their allies.  
          Nuclear powers technically do not even need alliances. Joffe (1989) writes, “From 
the vantage point of pure strategic logic, they [alliances] are a luxury for those who 
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possess a credible independent deterrent” (31). Nuclear powers simply cannot gain any 
additional capabilities to improve their security blanket provided by nuclear weapons. 
Waltz (1993) goes a step further by arguing “Nuclear states easily generate second-strike 
forces, they do not need one another’s help at the strategic level. Strategically, nuclear 
weapons make alliances obsolete” (73). Clearly interdependence between nuclear powers 
and other allies is low in a nuclear world. Therefore, alliance pathologies will not affect 
nuclear superpowers the same way they do non-nuclear superpowers.  
Expected Pathologies 
          Nuclear powers do not need to rely on alliances for their security, so alliance 
pathologies are not expected to influence nuclear powers. Waltz (1981) writes, “The non-
additivity of nuclear forces means that in our bipolar world efforts of lesser states cannot 
tilt the strategic balance” (3). If the relative contributions of minor powers had more sway 
on nuclear powers, then nuclear superpowers would be at risk of alliance pathologies. 
However, because nuclear powers have all of the internal balancing they would ever need 
there is little chance that alliance pathologies will influence nuclear powers into doing 
something they do not wish.  
          Nuclear weapons provide deterrence between superpowers, which further 
eliminates the importance of alliances in a nuclear system. Jervis (1989) argues, “In the 
nuclear era, by contrast, security is provided by second-strike capability; defections by 
allies are therefore less damaging” (36). This deterrence has altered how countries 
perceive their offensive/defensive advantage in relation to other countries. Waltz (1993) 
writes, “Offensive and defensive advantage has been transformed by nuclear weapons 
into deterrent strength easily achieved” (71). 
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In assessing the relative lethality of offensive, defensive, and deterrent operations 
in particular historical eras, one must determine whether there was an absolute 
weapon – a weapon capable of destroying not just other weapons but also entire 
geographical areas, such as cities. When such a weapon exists, states can punish 
their opponents without first achieving victory through offensive or defensive 
operations. Thus deterrence dominates. From 1800 to 1944, force lethality grew 
markedly, but no absolute existed. Thus deterrence was dominated by offense or 
defense. But once the atomic bomb was developed in 1945, deterrent operations 
became easier and more robust than ever before (Adams 2003/4, 54-5) 
 
In a nuclear world, non-nuclear minor powers may still perceive offensive or defensive 
advantages in relations with each other. However, nuclear powers will no longer perceive 
themselves in terms of offensive or defensive advantages, but focus on deterrence. Minor 
powers may try to use alliance pathologies to coerce nuclear superpowers into supporting 
them, but because nuclear powers are now concerned with deterrence they will not risk 
destruction over a minor power’s interests. Under such conditions alliance pathologies 
are not expected to pose problems in any system with nuclear weapons.  
Evaluating the Literature           
          The literature indicates that states in bipolar systems as well as international 
systems with nuclear weapons will not have significant issues with alliance pathologies. 
The problem, of course, is that the literature only describes bipolar systems with nuclear 
weapons, so one cannot discern whether bipolarity or nuclear weapons alone are 
responsible for the insignificance of the pathologies. (Figure 3, illustrates this problem 
below using a two-by-two Figure.) Christensen (1997) in a later article almost seems to 
acknowledge this problem, “Many scholars believe the cold war peace to have been 
caused by the dual factors of MAD and bipolarity, but they have not carefully considered 
that the former condition may have depended on the latter” (94). In addition Christensen 
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and Snyder (1990) also cautioned in their original article, that any future research 
concerning alliance pathologies will need to factor in nuclear weapons, since nuclear 
deterrence could alter one’s defensive advantage and impair ‘traditional checkerboard 
balancing logic’ for multipolar systems in the future (168). “Insofar as nuclear weapons 
are likely to make each pole individually invulnerable to conquest, a nuclear-armed 
multipolarity may resemble the stable 1880s more than it will the chain-ganging 1910s or 
buck-passing 1930s” (Christensen and Snyder 1990, 168). But curiously they neglected 
to factor in how nuclear weapons may affect alliance pathologies in their description of 
bipolar systems.  
          The alliance dilemma literature does not fare much better. As mentioned above, 
Snyder (1990) argues that “The alliance management problem is easier in bipolar than 
multipolar alliances, at least in alliances of the superpowers, because the structure of the 
system provides little opportunity or incentive for defection” (Snyder 1990, 118). And 
even when introducing nuclear weapons Snyder (1984) recognizes that alliance 
pathologies are possible but changes his focus to demonstrate how small allies, not great 
powers will be affected by alliance pathologies. “Thus, to Europe nuclear abandonment 
means either a withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear deterrent or an evaporation of its 
credibility. Nuclear entrapment means the actual use of nuclear weapons in case 
deterrence fails, especially in a way that makes Europe the principal battleground” 
(Snyder 1984, 492). Although these are valid points and ought to be mentioned. These 
points, fail to address the problem of distinguishing which characteristic bipolarity or 
nuclear weapons are responsible for the determining the significance of alliance 
pathologies as desired.   
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          This thesis seeks to resolve this problem, so that one can more easily distinguish 
whether bipolarity or nuclear weapons is solely responsible for the insignificance of 
alliance pathologies. In order to accomplish this task I will isolate the two independent 
variables by selecting a Case Study with a bipolar distribution of power, which will not 
have nuclear weapons. So for this paper I selected Classical Greece during the 
Peloponnesian Wars when Athens and Sparta were considered Dual Hegemons (two 
leaders) in the Greek sphere of influence.  (See below for more details.) As this Case 
Study fits the criteria, I will now be able to analyze the most important minor powers 
using the method prescribed in the literature to ascertain whether or not alliance 
pathologies do or do not have a significant impact on their allies under the controlled 
conditions. This will provide greater insight into alliance pathologies and increase 
understanding of the political environment by enabling better policy recommendations 





Chapter III  
 
Research Design 
Variables and Operationalization 
Independent Variable 1: Distribution of Power [Controlled by Case Selection] 
          The independent variable, distribution of power, comes from Waltz’s theory of the 
international political system (1979). He conceptualizes the ‘distribution of power’ as the 
spread of capabilities across the units of the international system (Waltz 1979). When two 
states possess the concentration of the international system’s power, the system is bipolar 
(Waltz 1979). An empirical example of a bipolar system is the United States and the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War. When more than two states possess the concentration 
of the international system’s power, the system is a multipolar system (Waltz 1979). An 
empirical example of a multipolar is the type of international system before the First 
World War, in which several European countries possessed the concentration of the 
power in the international system.  
Independent Variable 2: Nuclear Weapons [Controlled by Case Selection] 
          Nuclear weapons as a unit-level attribute stems from the International Relation’s 
literature on internal balancing via nuclear weapons. Waltz writes that nuclear 
capabilities are the product of the great national capabilities of states, but they do not 
influence the stability of the international system (1964). However if nuclear weapons 
provide states with internal means of protection, then states will rely less on external 
means of protection. Therefore alliances would be less meaningful in an international 
system with nuclear weapons.  
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Dependent Variable 1: Significance of Alliance Pathologies 
          The dependent variable, alliance pathologies, originates from the International 
Relation’s literature concerning alliances. Alliance pathologies encompass the adverse 
ally behaviors of chain-ganging, buck-passing, entrapment, abandonment, and other 
forms of opportunism (Christensen and Snyder 1990; Lake 1996). Empirically chain-
ganging and entrapment represent the acts of a state dragging another state into a conflict 
(Christensen and Snyder 1990; Snyder 1984). Abandonment and Buck-passing are 
characterized by a state defecting from its alliance or not providing its share of the burden 
for the alliance’s security (Christensen and Snyder 1990; Snyder 1984). However in order 
to ease operationalization and maintain thoroughness, the Dependent Variable will be 
divided up by the two themes: offensive/defensive advantage and alliance dilemma.   
          The perception of one’s Offensive/Defensive Advantage is determined by three 
main indicators: (1) Geography, may impede an aggressor and favor defense or permit an 
attacker’s offense (Jervis 1978, 194). (2) Military Capability, derived from ‘technology 
can favor the aggressor or defender’ (Van Evera 1998, 16-18). (3) Formative experiences, 
obtained from prior wars shape how soldiers and policymakers view the international 
structure at the given moment (Christensen and Snyder 1990, 145).  
          The behaviors affiliated with Alliance Dilemma are operationalized as four 
indicators: (1) Dependence, how much one ally needs the assistance of another ally and 
their perception of this dependence (Snyder 1984, 471-2). (2) Explicit Commitment 
reduces fear that an ally will abandon the alliance whereas vague commitments increase 
these fears (Snyder 1984, 473-4). (3) “Strategic Interests is an interest of keeping the 
ally’s power resources out of the opponent’s hands” (Snyder 1984, 472-3). (4) Behavior 
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Record, strategy options influenced by ‘one’s own and others’ recent past’ (Snyder 1984, 
474-5).               
          Figure 4, illustrates how the dependent variable, alliance pathologies, can be 
operationalized into measurable items such as geography, military capability 
(technology), behavior record as well as other points of interests needed to gauge the 
state’s perception of the offensive/defensive balance. Consequently this will help 
determine the major states dependence on their allies by ascertaining what the major 
power stands to lose or have the potential to lose should alliance pathologies occur. 
Therefore one can judge how significantly alliance pathologies can impact the major 
powers and their alliances by understanding what capabilities the major powers are at risk 
of losing from these adverse behaviors.  
 
Hypotheses: 
          The literature review indicates that alliance pathologies can be subdivided into two 
themes. This required refining the research question into sub-hypotheses to account for 
each theme’s pathologies. So that observations from both themes will be accounted for in 
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the overall assessment. This will eliminate the possibility of ‘false-negative’ reporting 
from the data indicating that pathologies are not present when in fact they are.   
 (H0) Alliance Pathologies are not significant in Bipolar Systems. 
 (HA1) Alliance Pathologies are significant in Non-Nuclear Bipolar Systems. 
o (HA1.a) Alliance Pathologies associated with Offensive/Defensive 
Advantage are significant in Non-Nuclear Bipolar Systems. 
o (HA1.b) Alliance Pathologies associated with the Alliance Dilemma are 
significant in Non-Nuclear Bipolar Systems.   
 
Case Selection  
          Classical Greece 
 
            I selected Classical Greece during the period 460 BCE – 420 BCE, to study the 
alliance behaviors among two superpowers and eliminate any possible influence that 
might be associated with nuclear weapons. I chose this particular time and place for the 
following reasons. First, during this period the Persian Empire had little to no influence 
on Greek affairs. The Peace of Kallias around 449 BCE, retracted Persian activity to the 
areas east of Cyprus (Cawkwell 1997). It was not until 412 BCE after the Athenian 
disaster in Sicily that Persia re-emerged to play a major role as a power broker in the 
Greek World. This makes it possible to evaluate the Greek’s alliance behaviors without 
outside interference.  
          Second, between 460 – 412 BCE the Greek world came to be dominated by the two 
Greek city-states Athens and Sparta, a phenomenon referred to as ‘Dual Hegemony’ in 
the literature (Dickens 1911, 242). It is also clear that the Greeks themselves considered 
Athens and Sparta to be the two most powerful states of the time and these ideas are 
reflected in their writings. Herodotus (1.28) writes that the King of Lydia, Croesus, 
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sought out the most powerful Greek states to form an alliance, he discovered that the 
“Spartans were the most eminent of the Dorians and the Athenians of the Ionian.” These 
notions also extend to the Attic Orators like Isocrates who writes:  
Some of the Greeks follow us, others follow the Spartans, and the governments by 
which they manage their cities have divided most of them along these lines. Thus 
whoever thinks that the others will accomplish anything good before the two 
leading cities are reconciled is quite naïve and out of touch with the situation. But 
someone who is not only seeking to make a display, but wishes to accomplish 
something, must look for the kind of arguments  that will persuade these two 
cities to share equally with each other, to take up joint leadership, and to gain 
advantages from the Persian King that they currently want to get from the other 
Greeks. (Isoc. 4.16-17) 
Nevertheless, Thucydides (1.18) explains that this condition continued to grow after the 
Persian Wars and becoming more solidified as the Greeks “split into two divisions, one 
group following Athens and the other Sparta. These were clearly the two most powerful 
states, one being supreme on land, the other on the sea.” This drove the two hegemons to 
compete in order to acquire as many allies as possible, developing into ‘a condition of 
bitterly rivalrous bipolarity’ (Eckstein 2006, 48).     
          So is there any way to measure the disparity between the hegemons and the rest? It 
is indeed possible to get a sense of this disparity by comparing the total population 
estimates available for the Greek city-states of this era. Morgenthau (1967) writes “the 
size of population is one of the factors upon which national power rests” (119). The 
scholars making these estimates take into account the state’s total size in square 
kilometers in conjunction with the amount of arable land required to support a given 
population. While the numbers of these estimates vary it is possible to get a sense of the 
scale for the populations in question. So for instance Beloch (1922) estimates that the 
Athenian territory could support a total population of 200,000 people (273). (According 
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to Legon [1981] Beloch’s estimates for the Athenian population are among the lowest 
proposed by any scholar.) While, Finley (1963) writes “the Athenian population was at 
its peak, at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 431, the total, including men, 
women and children, free and slave, was about 250,000 or perhaps 275,000” (54-5). 
Beloch estimates the total Spartan population including citizens, freemen (Perioeci), and 
slaves (Helots) to have been approximately 230,000 people (Beloch 1922, 284-5). As for 
the rest, Corinth could support a total population estimated to be between 60,000 and 
70,000 people (Beloch 1922; Salmon 1997, 130). Megara’s total population is estimated 
to have been approximately 40,000 people (Beloch 1922, 309; Legon 1981, 24). Beloch 
(1922) estimates Thebe’s total population to be around 30,000 to 50,000 people before 
the start of the Archidamian War in 431 BCE (287-8). And the total population for Samos 
is estimated to have been as large as 50,000 people (Shipley 1987, 15).    
          Another way to get a sense of the population size is to examine how many heavy 
infantry (hoplite) troops each city-state could field to support their military engagements. 
After all Morgenthau (1967) writes “it is thus obvious that a nation cannot be of the first 
rank without a population sufficiently large to create and apply material implements of 
national power” (120). So I will demonstrate this by showing how many hoplites the two 
major powers and a few of the others supplied at the final battle of the Persian Wars, the 
Battle of Plataea in 479 BCE. According to Herodotus (9.28) the Athenians supplied 
8,000 hoplites to the battle, Corinth supplied 5,000 hoplites, and Megara supplied 3,000 
hoplites. Various other Greek city-states supplied an assorted number of hoplites as well 
as a total of 69,500 auxiliaries (Herod. 9.29). The Spartans on the other hand supplied a 
total of 10,000 hoplites of which 5,000 were of the freemen (Perioeci) class as well as 
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35,000 light infantry helots (Herod. 9.28). The total Greek forces at the Battle of Plataea 
numbered 110,000 (Herod. 9.30). So from the total number of Greek forces at the Battle 
of Plataea, the Spartans provided roughly 41% of the total troop strength. Table 1, 
summarizes the total population estimates as well as the hoplite contributions per city-
state in the table below.      
 
           So what was the role of the Greek allies from 460 BCE – 420 BCE? Modern 
political theory maintains that allies do not play a major role in inter-state relations when 
there are two superpowers, because modern superpowers rely primarily on internal 
resources rather than external resources from allies. However this does not seem to be the 
case with allies in Classical Greece. Mosley (1971) writes, “The great powers did not 
depend upon the inventions of weaponry and technology for their strength so much as 
upon military and naval training and tactics and, to an even greater extent, upon the 
extension of alliances” (319). This point is exemplified by Thucydides in the Mytilenian 
debate, when Cleon argues that the Mytilenian revolt must be punished or other allies 
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will revolt. Thucydides (3.39) writes, “If our efforts are successful, we shall recover a 
city that is in ruin, and so lose future revenue from it, on which our strength is based." It 
is clear that Athens relied heavily on her allies for strength in this period.  
           Sparta also relied heavily on her alliance to aid in putting down insurrections in 
the Peloponnese. Sparta had captured and enslaved the population of Messene, who 
became known as Helots (Cartledge 2009).  The Helots would frequently rise up and 
rebel against the Spartans. Kagan (2009) writes, “Sparta’s security and its way of life 
rested, to some considerable degree, on the integrity of its alliances, so even the 
suggestion of defections that might lead to dissolution was alarming” (65). It is apparent 
that the Spartans used their alliance to enhance their power position in the Peloponnese.       
          It is among these Athenian and Spartan allies that I will evaluate the implication of 
alliance pathologies for this case study. I will analyze a total of six allies, three of the 
most prominent allies from the Athenian alliance known as the Delian League and three 
of the most important allies from the Spartan alliance sometimes referred to as the 
Peloponnesian League. The allies that I will be studying from the Delian League will 
include: Samos, Chios, and Mytilene. And the allies I have chosen to examine for the 
Peloponnesian League include: Thebes, Corinth, and Megara. I will use the 
operationalized indicators geography, military capability, behavior record, etc. to 
ascertain not only how the dependent variables affect Athens and Sparta, but also the 
entire system as a whole. I will primarily focus on alliance behaviors during the 
Archidamian War (431 – 421 BCE), but I will also examine alliance behaviors that 
occurred during the First Peloponnesian War (ca 460 –446 BCE), and in some instances 
earlier to establish a pattern of activity.  
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Method of Analysis 
Process Tracing  
          In order to investigate the causal mechanism for my hypotheses I plan on using the 
process tracing method. Process tracing will enable me to investigate the causal chain of 
events to see how conditions are translated into outcomes (Van Evera 1997, 64). Van 
Evera (1997) explains that “Antecedent conditions will leave footprints in this process: 
actors may refer to their importance and events will occur in a sequence that follows their 
appearance or disappearance” (74). This method would be useful for my thesis, since 
there is a lack of quantitative data in Classical Greece, indicating that process tracing 
would be quite suitable. Moreover the process tracing variety of analytical explanation 
would be beneficial by clarifying the causal path and integrating it with the theory. 
George and Bennett (2005) explain that this is done by being deliberately selective on 
what the proposed conditions are the affect the outcomes. George and Bennett argue that 
process tracing should be applied to testing alternative theories since they can specify 
either complementary or exclusive causal processes from the theories (218).  
Types of Evidence 
          I will gather case evidence from a variety of primary sources such as: histories 
(including historical speeches), philosophies, dramatic literature, and inscriptions off of 






Peculiarities of Classical Greece 
          A key defining characteristic of the Greek city-state was the fierce desire to be 
politically independent. Each city-state desired it at almost any cost. 
In practice autonomous means that it [city-state] can make its own decisions, free 
from violent interference by a stronger state, about what is and what is not in the 
interest of its survival, and it can dispose of the military means necessary to the 
implement measure necessary to ensure its survival. (Ostwald 1982, 29)  
Greek city-states fiercely defended their autonomy and independence from other city-
states. “Of course the very act of joining a large-scale alliance meant the surrender of an 
independent foreign policy, especially where the alliance treaties were concluded forever 
and there was no explicit right of secession” (Ryder 1965, 20). This is also reflected in 
the modern political theory. As, Morgenthau (1967) argues, “A nation loses its 
sovereignty when it is placed under the authority of another nation, so that it is the latter 
that exercises supreme authority to give and enforce the laws within the former’s 
territory” (305). Joining an alliance typically restricts a country’s foreign policy, but it is 
still considered independent if it can make and pass its own domestic laws.  
          Classicists debate why city-states align with particular city-states. Macmullen 
(1963) writes, “Big powers in Greece throughout the fifth and fourth centuries preferred 
to deal with poleis of like constitution, and tended to encourage or impose their own form 
of government on other states as a prerequisite to alliance” (122). He also explains that if 
a city-state entered into an alliance with a city-state with an opposite form of constitution, 
its loyalty was always in question (Macmullen 1963). But city-states with opposite forms 
of constitutions did become allies. “Ideological considerations were apparent in the aims 
and practice of Greek diplomacy, but they were largely evident as pretexts and material 
for propaganda” (Adcock and Mosley 1975, 139). Both Thucydides and Aristotle claim 
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that Mantinea, a Spartan ally, had a democratic constitution, while Sparta had an 
oligarchic constitution (Amit 1973, 138). However Adcock and Mosley (1975) claim, 
“Treaties and alliances were normally concluded for immediate and pressing reasons” 
(136). “It was usually a reaction to a danger rather than an abstract anticipation of some 
situation that led states to seek allies” (Adcock and Mosley 1975, 132). Both of these 
arguments appear in modern political science. However the latter argument suggesting 
city-states form alliances out of fear is the most prominent Balance of Threat literature.  
          Another issue of contention may be the role of honor and ethnicity to compel allies 
to behave in certain ways. Lebow (2007) writes, “Sthenelaȉdas appealed to his 
countrymen’s spirit and yearning for honor and related desire to avoid shame by ignoring 
the pleas of their hard-pressed allies” (169). While role of honor and ethnicity (kinship) 
appears to have played a role, the observations from the case study show that the great 
powers leveraged these characteristics when it suited them. But minor powers who tried 
to use the same qualities to induce major powers to come to their aid were more often 
than not left disappointed. In 426 BCE, the Ambraciots and several other allies convinced 
the Spartans to help them against their enemies, but these allies were defeated when the 
Spartans took the opportunity to withdraw after making a secret deal with the Athenians 
(Thuc. 3.109). According to Thucydides (3.109) Demosthenes’ purpose in offering this 
deal was to discredit the Spartans with the Greek world and the rest of their allies. But 
this action does not seem to have significantly harmed Sparta’s reputation, because in 416 
BCE the Melians also thought that these characteristics would encourage the Spartans to 
come to their rescue when the Athenians threatened the Melians to join the Athenian 
alliance or face destruction. According to Thucydides the Melians argued:  
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What we lack in power, we trust that it will be made up for by our alliance with 
the Spartans, who are bound if for no other reason, than for honor’s sake, and 
because we are their kinsmen, to come to our help. (Thuc. 5.104) 
In the end the Spartans did not come to the aid of Melos. “The Melians surrendered 
unconditionally to the Athenians, who put to death all the men of military age, and sold 
the women and children as slaves”  (Thuc. 5.116). Moreover, the Athenians behaved no 
differently than Sparta in this respect. In 429 BCE, the Plataeans held-out under a 
Peloponnesian siege on the promise that the Athenians would come to their aid (Thuc. 
2.74). Of course the Athenians never came and the city was lost in the same manner as 
Melos. And the Athenians had no misgivings about crushing revolts by their kinsmen. In 
441 BCE, the Athenians put down the Samian Revolt, which was conducted by their 
kinsmen. When questioned about these practices at the Debate in Camarina in 415 BCE, 
an Athenian named Euphemus replies:  
When a man or city exercises absolute power the logical course is the course of 
self-interests, and ties of blood exist only when they can be relied upon; one must 
choose one’s friends and enemies according to the circumstances on each 
particular occasion. (Thuc. 6.85) 
In another Thucydides translation by Benjamin Jowett in 1881, there is more of an 
emphasis on the great power using ethnicity as a form of ‘expediency’ to ‘manage allies’ 
and achieve one’s self-interests.             
         There are three possible limitations to selecting Classical Greece as my research 
case. First, there is a lack of reliable quantifiable data. Therefore collecting accurate 
census data, numbers of soldiers, and ships will be difficult to achieve. Second, the 
alliances formed by the Greek city-states were not multilateral agreements between each 
city-state in the alliance. Ryder (1965) writes, “This series of bilateral agreements 
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between the Spartans and Athenians only reflected the dominance of the two cities within 
their two alliance systems, and alliances themselves, though uniting numerous cities, 
were not truly multilateral in form” (3). Finally, the Greek city-states did not use 
‘permanent ambassadors’ or establish ‘diplomatic missions to other city-states’ (Eckstein 
2006; Mosley 1971). The lack of diplomats between city-states would make it difficult 
for the city-states to resolve their issues and maintain tabs on each other. These three 
issues will pose a minor challenge when conducting research during this time period, but 



















The Spartan Allies 
 
Section A: Thebes 
          Thebes became the leading city-state of the Boeotian district by the middle of the 
5
th
 century BCE by creating a federation of independent cities and towns sometimes 
referred to as the Boeotian League (Larsen 1968). Boeotia itself is located in central 
Greece and consists of open plains with rivers and lakes bounded by the Cithaeron and 
Parnes Mountains to the southeast (bordering Attica), ‘the Gulf of Corinth to the south, 
the Gulf of Euboea to the east, Locris to the north, and Phocis to the west’ (Grant 1986, 
113). Plant (1994) explains that “The topography of Boeotia is well suited to hoplite 
battles, with ample open land to allow the hoplites to meet in disciplined formations” 
(272). According to Plant ‘many commanders in the fifth and fourth centuries’ preferred 
Boeotia as a battleground since many significant Greek battles took place there including: 
Battle of Plataea, Battle of Tanagra, Battle of Oinophyta, and Battle of Delium (Plant 
1994). This coincides with Plutarch referring to Boeotia as ‘the stage of war’ and that the 
Boeotians themselves were ‘always in arms’ and ‘their hands were upon their shields’ 
(Plut. Moralia 193. e 18). Nevertheless “Boeotia was rendered indifferent to maritime 
matters by her fertile soil and by the mountain rim of her old lake basin, which kept her 
chief centers of population secluded from the coast” (Semple 1931, 602).  These plains 
allowed the Boeotians to produce a high quality variant of heavy wheat known 
throughout the Mediterranean. “The wheat of Boeotia occupies the first rank, that of 
Sicily the second, and that of Africa the third. … The Boeotian wheat, again, weighs a 
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whole pound more than these last, and that of Africa a pound and three quarters” (Plin. 
Nat. 18.12). In addition Theophrastus writes “Athletes in Boeotia consume scarcely three 
pints, while, when they come to Athens, they easily manage five” (Theophr. Hist. Plant. 
8.4.5). These Boeotian attributes allowed the people to not only provide for themselves 
but also create one of the largest cavalries in Greece.    
           Boeotian cities and towns competed to become the hegemon of Boeotia during 




 centuries BCE. According to Herodotus magistrates from Thebes 
refer to Tanagra, Coronea, and Thespia as being their allies in 506 BCE (Herod. 5.79; 
Larsen 1968). But the city Orchomenus west of Lake Copaȉs ‘had a tendency to go its 
own way and oppose Thebes’ dominating the eastern region of Boeotia (Larsen 1968, 
27). Plataea nearly eight miles south of Thebes had a long history of opposing Theban 
ambitions (Thuc. 2.5). Around 519 BCE Thebes put so much pressure on Plataea that the 
Plataeans requested an alliance with Sparta, but the Spartans refused and suggested that 
Athens would be better suited to be their ally due to the distance between them (Herod. 
6.108; Thuc. 3.55; Larsen 1968). The Plataeans took the advice and became allies with 
Athens (Herod. 6.108). Immediately after Plataea established the alliance with Athens, 
Thebes sent an army to attack Plataea requiring the Athenians to come to the city’s 
defense (Herod. 6.108). However, before the fighting started Corinthian arbiters settled 
the dispute by demarcating one side of the Asopus River, and from Plataea to Hysiae on 
the other side to represent the new frontier between Plataea and Boeotian (Herod 6.108). 
Theban hostility towards Athens ensued from the establishment of the Athenian and 
Plataean Alliance which frustrated Theban attempts to win over new Boeotian cities and 
towns into its sphere of influence (Figueria 1981; Larsen 1968).    
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           Then in 506 BCE Herodotus (5.79) mentions that the Peloponnesians, Boeotians, 
and Chalcidians organized a joint attack on Attica from three different directions. The 
Boeotians captured the ‘two outlying Attic demes of Oenoe and Hysiae, while the 
Chalcidians broke in from another direction and devastating that part of Attica (Herod. 
5.74; Larsen 1968). However the Corinthians were unhappy to discover that the true 
purpose of the Spartan invasion was to install the Athenian tyrant, Isagoras, so they 
deserted the Spartans at Eleusis in southern Attica (Herod. 5.74). Herodotus (5.75) writes 
“Then the other allied troops [Peloponnesians], when they saw the split between the 
Spartan kings and the desertion of the Corinthians, also abandoned their positions and left 
the field.” Until this point the Athenians held off attacking the Boeotian and Chalcidian 
troops to focus on the Spartans, now attacked and defeated both of them piecemeal 
(Herod. 5.74-7; Buck 1972, 100). The Athenians re-captured Oenoe and presumably 
Hysiae, since Thucydides refers to Oenoe as an Athenian fortress on the Boeotian and 
Attica frontier in 431 BCE (Thuc. 2.18; Larsen 1968, 30). In addition to the losses 
suffered by Boeotia, Athens settled 4,000 Athenians in Chalkis to deprive the richest 
class of Chalcidians and to establish a garrison to control the area (Herod. 5.77; Herod. 
6.100; Tod no. 12 & 42; Meiggs & Lewis no. 15; Ostwald 2002, 135). Sparta’s 
abandonment directly led to the defeat of Boeotia and Chalkis by Athens, who 
established a lasting foothold in Chalkis with an Athenian garrison.       
The First Peloponnesian War (ca. 460 – 446 BCE) 
          In 457 BCE Phocis invaded Doris capturing one of its three towns in central 
Greece. Sparta considered Doris to be its metropolis or mother city, so the Spartans 
mobilized an allied force to eliminate the Phocian threat from Doris (Thuc. 1.107; Sealey 
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1976; Hornblower 1983). Soon “The Spartans compelled the Phocians to come to terms 
and to give back the [Dorian] town which they had taken” (Thuc. 1.107). At this point 
Thucydides (1.107) tells us that the Spartans waited in Boeotia for a safe route home to 
develop. However Diodorus (11.81) reveals that the Thebans appealed to the Spartans for 
help re-establishing their city as the Boeotian hegemon. A position they lost after being 
humiliated by the Greek world for their alliance with Persia during the Persian War. 
Nevertheless the Thebans pledged that they would wage war on Athens if the Spartans 
would re-establish them as the Boeotian hegemon (Justinus 3.6). According to Diodorus 
(11.81) The Spartans decided that it was in their interests to bolster Thebes as a 
counterbalance to Athens. Plant (1994) suggests that the Spartans may have been 
carrying out this process while they were at Tanagra, since Tanagra had its own coinage 
and protective walls (two significant displays of independence and power in classical 
Greece) and likely stood in the way of Theban Hegemony (268-9). Nevertheless the 
Athenians came up to fight the Spartan and Boeotian troops at the Battle of Tanagra in 
457 BCE resulting in a narrow victory for the Spartans that allowed the Spartans to return 
to the Peloponnese (Plat. Menex. 242; Paus. 1.29.9). Kagan (1969) writes “The Athenians 
could not yet know that the Spartans were prepared to abandon their Theban allies, if, in 
fact they already decided to do so” (93). Not long after the Spartan departure, the 
Athenians met the Boeotians at the Battle of Oenophyta in 457 BCE. The Athenians 
soundly defeated the Boeotians at the battle and proceeded to conquer the rest of Boeotia 
(except Thebes), Phocis, and Locris (Thuc. 1.108; Diod. 11.83).     
            In 447 BCE Orchomenus successfully led some of the Boeotians towns in a revolt 
against the Athenians (Larsen 1968, 128). Athens responded by dispatching 1,000 
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hoplites, commanded by Tolmides, to Boeotia where they captured Chaeronea and 
established a garrison (Thuc. 1.113). But the Boeotians attacked the Athenians at 
Coronea on their way home killing some and taking others prisoner. According to 
Thucydides (1.113) “The Athenians then made a treaty by which they got back their 
prisoners at the price of evacuating the whole of Boeotia.” Buck (1970) argues that from 
the Athenian point of view, a rising Orchomenus as the Boeotian hegemon could balance 
Thebes and so ‘Orchomenus, Plataea, and Thespiae together could check Thebes’ 
creating a ‘convenient buffer’ for Athens (226). This may also represent the fragile state 
of the Delian League at the time which saw revolts in Euboea and Megara following the 
one that occurred in Boeotia (Thuc. 1.113).   
The Archidamian War (431 – 421 BCE) 
          In March 431 BCE Thebes launched a surprise night attack on Plataea using a 
vanguard of 300 soldiers with the rest of their forces en route (Thuc. 2.2; Thuc. 2.5; Diod. 
12.41). According to Thucydides “Realizing that war was certain to come, the Thebans 
were anxious to get control of Plataea first (since Plataea had always been hostile to 
them) while it was still peacetime and war had not yet actually broke out” (2.2). Kagan 
(1969) offers an alternative “This time they [the Thebans] wanted to control Plataea, 
which guarded the road to Thebes from Athens, before the war got under way” (342). 
The Thebans tried to take the city from inside using sympathetic Plataeans; but when the 
majority of the Plataeans noticed the relative small size of the Theban force they 
counterattacked, taking advantage of the Thebans’ unfamiliarity of the city’s layout to 
kill and capture a number of prisoners (Thuc. 2.3-4). When the news reached Athens, the 
Athenians instructed the Plataeans not to do anything ‘irrevocable’ with the Theban 
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prisoners without first consulting them (Thuc. 2.6). But it was already too late, the 
Plataeans put 180 prisoners to death even though the main ‘Theban force left the Plataean 
territory without doing any harm’ (Thuc. 2.5). Afterwards Athenian troops marched into 
Plataea bringing provisions and establishing a garrison of 80 Athenians but did not 
advance to Thebes, instead they evacuated the majority of the population including the 
women, children, and men unable to fight (Thuc. 2.6; Thuc. 2.78; Diod. 12.42).   
          The Spartans responded by sending messengers to their allies with instructions to 
send two-thirds of their troops and supplies to the Isthmus of Corinth to invade Attica 
(Thuc. 2.10). The Spartans also sent an envoy to Athens to see whether the Athenians 
would give in to their terms (see the Megara section below for more details). “But the 
Athenians refused him admission to the city or access to their assembly” (Thuc. 2.12). So 
in May 431 BCE the Spartans and their allies invaded Attica to lay waste to the land and 
destroy property in order to incite the Athenians to come out from behind their walls and 
fight a pitched battle. “The Boeotians had provided their contingent and also their cavalry 
for the main force and with their remaining troops went out against Plataea and laid waste 
there” (Thuc. 2.12). The Peloponnesians and Thebans first set out to besiege the Athenian 
fort at Oenoe which defended Attica from Boeotia and was probably used to resupply the 
Athenian garrison at Plataea, but they failed to make any progress capturing the fort 
(Thuc. 2.18-9). So they made their way south to plunder the Eleusinian and Thriasian 
plains. They subsequently pillaged Acharnae, only seven miles from Athens, before 
heading north to Decelea and continuing on to Oropus where they retired to Boeotia 
(Thuc. 2.21-3; Bury 1967). The Peloponnesians and their allies repeatedly invaded Attica 
nearly every summer thereafter.  
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          But in 429 BCE the Peloponnesians and Thebans focused their energy on besieging 
Plataea rather than invading Attica (Thuc. 2.71). Kagan (1974) asserts that the 
‘destruction of the previous year had been thorough’ and Attica was still dealing with a 
devastating plague from the preceding year. The Peloponnesians started by proposing to 
the Plataeans that their city would be given immunity if they renounced their alliance 
with Athens and become neutrals (Thuc. 2.72; Thuc. 3.64; Thuc. 3.68; Diod. 12.47). The 
Spartans granted the Plataeans an armistice to go to Athens to confer with them on their 
predicament (Thuc. 2.72-3). The Athenians responded by saying that they have ‘never 
once abandoned them to an aggressor’ while they were allies and that the Plataeans 
should maintain their oaths and ‘not make any changes in the existing alliance’ (Thuc. 
2.73). After learning that the Plataeans would not renounce their alliance, the 
Peloponnesians began building a circumvallation wall around the city to prevent raids 
and used other siege methods to bring about the city’s destruction or surrender (Thuc 
2.75-7; Diod. 12.47). The Peloponnesians later dismissed the majority of their troops 
leaving only a small contingent along with some Thebans to finish building and guarding 
the counter-wall (Thuc. 2.79; Diod. 12.47). By the summer of 427 BCE the Plataeans 
were running out of food and surrendered to the Peloponnesians (Thuc. 3.52; Diod. 
12.56). Afterwards the Plataeans were put on trial to determine whether they have helped 
Sparta during the course of the current war. The Plataeans argued that they and the 
Spartans fought together against the Persians; but the Thebans argued that they helped in 
the reduction of Aegina, a Peloponnesian ally during the First Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 
3.52-6). In the end it was decided that the Plataeans refused to renounce their alliance 
with Athens thereby losing their immunity, which made them and their city a valid 
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enemy target for destruction (Thuc. 3.64; Thuc. 3.68). Thucydides (3.68) writes that ‘Not 
less than 200’ Plataean men were put to death while their women were made into slaves. 
The city itself was re-settled by political refugees from Megara and pro-Spartan Plataean 
faction survived (Thuc. 3.68).   
             The Thebans intervened into Megara’s affairs when in 424 BCE Megara’s 
democratic party plotted with some Athenian generals to capture the city by giving the 
Athenians access to the city, but as the events transpired the Megarians refused to admit 
the Athenians (Thuc. 4.66-72). As a result the Athenians captured other parts of the 
Megarid namely the port city of Nisaea causing great turmoil for the city-state (Thuc. 
4.69-72). Fearing that Boeotia could be cut off from their Peloponnesian allies and be left 
at the mercy of the Athens, the Boeotians marched into Megara on their own accord to 
assist the Megarians. Demand (1982) writes that this was the ‘first independent action by 
the Boeotians outside of Boeotia itself (41). The Boeotians met the Spartans in Megara 
and even though Megara lost its port at Nisaea, the Peloponnesian League retained 
Megara as an ally and the Boeotians averted possible isolation.    
         Later that same year Athens launched a two-pronged offensive into Boeotia to turn 
some Boeotian cities over to the Athenian side (Thuc. 4.89; Diod. 12.69).  The Athenian 
general Demosthenes sailed to Siphae with a force of Acarnanians, but failed to achieve 
his objective when a Phocian leaked the details of the Athenian plan to the Spartans and 
Boeotians who quickly reinforced the area (Thuc. 4.89). Meanwhile the second stage of 
the Athenian plan called for the Athenian general, Hippocrates, to make an assault on 
Delium. But by the time Hippocrates arrived at Delium it was already crawling with 
Boeotian troops. Realizing that the Athenians lost the initiative Hippocrates began 
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fortifying Delium (Thuc. 4.89-90). According to Thucydides (4.95) Hippocrates rallied 
his troops by saying, “If we are victorious, the Peloponnesians, without the support of the 
Boeotian cavalry, will never again invade our land, and in one battle you will both gain 
this country and do much to free your own.” The Boeotians defeated the Athenians at the 
Battle at Delium, but an Athenian garrison still held Delium, so the Boeotians assaulted 
Delium, clearing it of Athenian troops 17 days later (Thuc. 4.96-101; Diod. 12.70).        
SUMMARY 
          The Theban attack on Plataea in March 431 BCE clearly shows that chain-ganging 
led to the outbreak of the Archidamian War. In fact several indicators that characterize 
how a country perceives its Offensive Advantage are represented in this particular case. 
For instance Boeotia’s geography (DV1.1) lacked the natural physical defenses capable 
of deterring potential aggressors. The open plains and river valleys described by Grant 
(1986) did little to hinder the onslaught of invading forces. Even though the Cithaeron 
and Parnes Mountain ranges on Boeotia’s southeastern border provided some protection 
against the Athenians. These obstacles were circumvented by Athens’ close relationship 
with Plataea and Chalkis by the start of the Archimadian War. Essentially Thebes found 
itself in a weak defensive position surrounded by hostile neighbours. The Thebans likely 
developed offensive strategies to make up for their defensive shortcomings.  
         Likewise, the Boeotian land supported a well-fed population leading to significant 
military capabilities (DV1.2) that made hoplite and cavalry forces widely available. 
Thucydides writes that the Spartans relied solely on the city-states Phocis, Locris, and 
Boeotia in central Greece to supply the Peloponnesian League with cavalry (Thuc. 2.9). 
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The Athenians on the other hand had their own cavalry squadron, which was 
complemented by the renowned Thessalian cavalry (Thuc. 2.22; Herod. 5.63; Arist. 
Const. Ath.19. 5). Actually right before the Battle of Delium in 424 BCE the Athenian 
General, Hippocrates, rallied his troops by saying that if the Athenians won the battle and 
destroyed the Boeotian cavalry, the Peloponnesians would not be able to invade Attica 
again (Thuc. 4.95). The Spartan dependence on Boeotia’s cavalry as well as the distance 
between the two allies enabled the Boeotians to make their own foreign policy decisions 
without too much interference from Sparta. So leading up to the Archidamian War, 
Thebes primarily focused its foreign policy on absorbing Plataea into the Boeotian 
League.    
          Formative experience (DV1.3) acquired during previous conflicts also influenced 
Theban military strategies at the onset of the Archidamian War. First, Herodotus (6.108) 
mentions that Thebes sent an army to attack Plataea in 519 BCE after the city-state 
formed an alliance with Athens. Even though the Boeotians broke off the impending 
attack when all parties submitted to arbitration. Thebes distinctly coveted Plataea to such 
a degree that the newly formed Athenian – Plataean alliance failed to deter Theban 
aggression from the outset. Perhaps Thebes sought to test Athens’ resolve to protect its 
new ally. Or maybe Thebes wanted to incorporate as much of Plataea’s territory as 
possible into Boeotia before Athens and Plataea grew closer together. Nevertheless this 
act established a precedent for Theban offensive action against Plataea despite her 
alliance with Athens.   
            Second, the joint Chalkidian, Boeotian, and Peloponnesian assault on Athens in 
506 BCE directly led to Boeotian and Chalkidian defeats. The Boeotians showed early 
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signs of success in the conflict by capturing the Athenian frontier demes of Hysiae and 
Oenoe (Herod. 5.74). But Sparta’s lack of transparency with her allies caused the 
Peloponnesian coalition to disintegrate, compelling the entire force to withdraw back into 
the Peloponnese. Sparta abandoned Boeotia and Chalkis at a critical time in the 
campaign, leaving them vulnerable to Athenian counterattacks. Ultimately Athens 
retaliated and retook the territories lost during the Boeotian and Chalkidian offensives 
(Herod. 5.74-7; Thuc. 2.18). In the end the Spartans put their own interests ahead of their 
allies, who suffered the consequences.      
Third, in 457 BCE during the First Peloponnesian War while the Spartans waited 
in central Greece for a route home to develop, they likely helped the Thebans restore their 
hegemonic position in Boeotia to counterbalance Athens growing power (Diod. 11.81; 
Justinius 3.6; Thuc. 1.107). Together the Thebans and Spartans defeated the Athenians at 
the Battle of Tanagra in 457 BCE. But soon after the battle the Spartans made their way 
home leaving the Thebans exposed to Athenian reprisals. The Athenians defeated the 
Boeotians at the Battle of Oenophyta in 457 BCE, which allowed Athens to dominate 
most of Boeotia, Phocis, and Locris for ten years until the Boeotian city-state 
Orchomenus successfully led a revolt in 447 BCE (Thuc. 1.108; Thuc. 1.113; Diod. 
11.83).     
          The combination of geographical features and formative experiences inspired 
Thebes’ offensive actions during the outbreak of the Archidamian War. Boeotia’s natural 
physical geography provided insufficient defense to the area from outsiders. But the land 
itself supported the development of significant military capabilities that could be used for 
offensive purposes. At the same time Boeotia’s history suggests that in the years leading 
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up to Archidamian War, Thebes was not afraid to attack Plataea regardless of her alliance 
with Athens. Likewise Thebes joined two previous Spartan alliances to attack Athens, 
only to be abandoned by Sparta on both occasions suffering losses during the first 
episode and near total Athenian domination on the second. Buck writes (1972) “It would 
not be surprising if Boeotian, and particularly Theban, confidence in Spartan leadership 
ebbed, and if the leaders of the Theban oligarchy felt that Sparta could not be trusted in 
grave situations” (100). Considering these circumstances Thebes would feel obligated to 
carry out a preemptive attack to secure vital objectives in the event of another large scale 
conflict. Kagan (1969) explains that Plataea guarded a strategic road connecting Athens 
and Thebes (342). Not only could Plataea alert Athens of a Theban invasion but also 
serve as an Athenian garrison along with Oenoe to launch incursions into Boeotia (Thuc. 
2.6; Thuc. 2.78; Thuc. 2.18; Diod. 12.42). In addition Grundy (1894) writes that another 
strategic road located at Plataea went from Plataea to Megara (6-7).  This road may have 
served as a major means of communication between the Thebans and the Peloponnesian 
League. Had the Thebans not taken Plataea when they did, the Plataeans and the 
Athenians could have cut off Theban communications with the Peloponnesians once the 
conflict started leaving the Boeotians and other central Greek allies isolated from the 






Section B: Corinth 
          Corinth had considerable influence within the Peloponnesian League in the period 
leading up to the Peloponnesian War. This influence not only stemmed from being a 
powerful ally but also from her strategic location. Corinth resided along the southwestern 
portion of the Isthmus of Corinth, the only land bridge connecting the Peloponnese with 
mainland Greece. Thucydides (1.13) writes that “Corinth [was] an important mercantile 
center, though in ancient days traffic had been by land rather than by sea. The 
communications between those who lived inside and those who lived outside the 
Peloponnese had to pass through Corinthian territory.” Corinth took advantage of this 
situation by collecting duties on Peloponnesian imports and exports (Strab. 8.6.20). But 
more importantly, Corinth was fortunate enough to occupy the narrowest portion of the 
Isthmus of Corinth where it is less than 4 miles (6 km) wide (Finley 1977). According to 
Finley (1977) “Early in the sixth century the diolkos was constructed, a paved or rock-cut 
track 5-foot (1.5 m) gauge by which ships or their cargoes could be wheeled across the 
Isthmus on bogeys” (154). Perhaps this system could allow commercial shipping to cut 
across the Isthmus between the Corinthian ports of Lechaeum on the Corinthian Gulf and 
Cenchreae on the Saronic Gulf (Salmon 1997, 31). Nevertheless, Corinth prospered from 
her ideal location to such a degree that she started to be referred to as ‘Wealthy’ in the 
Classical World (Strab. 8.6.20).  
          The Greek geographer Strabo (8.6.23) writes “The city [Corinth] had territory that 
was not very fertile, but rifted and rough.” Corinth relied on trade for importing vital 
foodstuffs and other resources like timber for shipbuilding to maintain her own maritime 
trade routes (Semple 1931; Hasebroek 1965). In turn the city-state gained the reputation 
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as a major manufacturing center by exporting items such as pottery and other wares 
(Semple 1931; Hasebroek 1965; Salmon 1997). The port city Lechaeum along the Gulf of 
Corinth became Corinth’s primary port due to the city’s location near the western shore 
of the Isthmus. This oriented the city’s commerce and subsequent colonization along the 
Ionian and Adriatic Sea areas west of Greece proper. (It is important to note that colonies 
of Classical Greece were independent city-states in their own right, not like the colonies 
of Spain, France, and England during the Age of Discovery.) Corinthian colonists 
founded Syracuse in Sicily around 733 B.C.E. to escape overpopulation and to take 
advantage of the land’s ability to grow wheat (Cartledge 2009, 115-125; Semple 1931, 
350; Grant 1986, 614). Corinthian colonists also settled Corcyra in the eighth century 
B.C.E. to export the timber in the area (Grant 1986, 185; Semple 1931, 281). Corinth 
went on to establish many other colonies in the Ionian Sea to create a sphere of influence 
in northwest Greece. But Syracuse and Corcyra stood apart from the other Corinthian 
colonies by being more powerful. Graham (1964) argues that the distance between 
Corinth and these two colonies granted Syracuse and Corcyra less cultural influence from 
their metropolis, which can be expressed by the difference in the coinage between the 
colonies and metropolis.   
          Eventually Corcyra began establishing her own colonies in the same area. Some of 
these colonies received colonists from both Corcyra and Corinth leading to disputes 
between the two over who could be claimed as the metropolis. According to Herodotus 
(3.49) “ever since the original settlement of the island the two peoples [Corcyra & 
Corinth] have been on bad terms.” And Thucydides adds that “the first naval battle on 
record is the one between the Corinthians and the Corcyraeans: this is about 260 years 
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ago” (1.13). Graham (1964) argues that Corinth pursued a foreign policy that undermined 
Corcyra’s influence in the co-founded colonies to promote Corinth’s interest and 
maintain her sphere of influence. He uses the colony Leucas as an example, since 
Plutarch explains that Themistocles, who served as an arbiter that settled a dispute 
between Corcyra and Corinth by confirming the ‘administer Leucas as a common colony 
of both cities’ (Them.  24.1). However Thucydides describes Leucas as none other than a 
Corinthian colony (1.30). However Graham’s example of Apollonia offers a more robust 
portrayal of this phenomenon. According to Strabo (7.5.8) Apollonia was founded by 
both the Corinthians and the Corcyraeans. However Pausanias (5.22.4) writes “Apollonia 
was a colony of Corcyra, they say, and Corcyra of Corinth, and the Corinthians had their 
share of the spoils.” But Thucydides (1.26) again refers to Apollonia solely as a 
Corinthian colony. Leading Graham (1964) to conclude that in the period leading up to 
the Archidamian War, Corinth eroded so much of Corcyra’s influence in some of these 
co-founded colonies that contemporaries began to think of them solely as Corinthian 
colonies.            
          To complicate matters further Athens started operating in northwest Greece, 
establishing the Pan-Hellenic colony of Thurii in southern Italy by inviting colonists from 
all over the Greek world (Diod. 12.10-11; Strab. 6.1.13; Arist. Pol. 5.1303a). At the same 
time Athens concluded alliances with the city-states Rhegion (Italy) and Leontini (Sicily) 
sometime between 446 – 440, BCE based on the writing style from the marble 
inscriptions used for the oaths of allegiance (Tod 1946, no 57). Wick (1976) suggests that 
the alliances with Rhegion and Leontini were likely connected to the foundation of 
Thurii, since Athens was too far away to send a quick response in the event that the 
54 
 
colony should find itself threatened (297). But in 434/3 BCE a civil dispute erupted in 
Thurii over Athens being the metropolis, but this was settled when all sides agreed to 
‘Delphi’ becoming their metropolis (Graham 1964, 198; Diod. 12.35). Even though 
Athens no longer needed Rhegion and Leontini to help protect Thurii, they remained 
Athenian allies due to threatening nature of Syracuse (Wick 1976). Athens later 
reaffirmed these treaties in 433/2 BCE by altering their preambles while leaving the rest 
of the text intact (Wick 1976; Thuc. 3.86; Fornara 1983, no. 124 & 125). Wick (1976) 
writes “All later Athenian activities in the West were intimately connected with Athenian 
alliances there” (293). 
           Athens also took control of Naupactus, an Ozolian Locrian town along the 
northern shore of the Gulf of Corinth (Thuc. 1.103). Corinth worried that the Athenians 
would harass Corinthian shipping from this new naval base by denying Corinth its vital 
maritime supplies. In 464 BCE a large earthquake rocked Laconia, provoking the helots 
(descendants of the Ancient Messenians) living there under Spartan domination to revolt 
(Thuc 1.101; Meiggs 1979). Sparta called upon the Peloponnesian League as well as the 
Athenians to help subdue the revolt (Thuc 1.102). (In this period, 462 BCE, the 
Athenians and the Spartans were still allies and on good terms dating back to 480 BCE.) 
However, the Spartans were suspicious that the non-Dorian Athenians would sympathize 
with the Messenians and inspire them with ‘radical’ thoughts and actions, so the Spartans 
dismissed the Athenians (Thuc. 1.102; Diod. 11.67). Athens reacted to the snub by 
withdrawing from their anti-Persian alliance with Sparta and allying with Sparta’s arch-
enemy Argos (Thuc. 1.102). Then around 459 BCE the helots and Spartans reached an 
agreement allowing the revolting helots to leave the Peloponnese without Spartan 
55 
 
interference (Thuc. 1.103). Athens re-settled these Messenian helots at Naupactus, 
creating a staunch Athenian ally in the region (Thuc. 1.103).   
 The First Peloponnesian War (ca. 460 – 446 BCE) 
            In the winter of 461 BCE a border war between Corinth and Megara resulted in 
Megara withdrawing from the Peloponnesian League in order to seek the protection of 
the Athenian alliance (See Below). Athens quickly took advantage of the situation by 
using the port of Pagae to access the Corinthian Gulf and bolstering Megara’s defenses to 
keep the Corinthians at bay (Thuc. 1.103). The Athenians then landed at the port of 
Haliae on the Argolid coast, where a combined force of Corinthian and Epidaurian 
soldiers defeated the Athenians in battle (Thuc. 1.105; Diod. 11.78). However Athens 
turned the tide by defeating the Corinthians in a sea battle near the island of Cecryphalia 
between Aegina and the Argolid coast within the Saronic Gulf (Thuc. 1.105; Diod 11.78). 
Aegina, another naval power had long been at odds with Athens and sometimes Corinth, 
who supplied Athens with twenty ships to attack Aegina 487 BCE, now entered the war 
on the side of the Corinthians and Epidaurians (Herod. 6.88-93; Thuc. 1.105; Hornblower 
1983, 16; Bury 1967, 258-60). The Athenians quickly engaged the Aeginetans near their 
coast capturing 70 Aeginetan ships and making landfall on the island (Thuc. 1.105; Diod. 
11.78). The Corinthian and Epidaurians tried to help the Aeginetans in two ways. First, 
they landed a relief force of 300 hoplites on the island. Second, the Corinthians sent a 
force to the Geraneia Heights in Megara to capture the new Athenian fortifications built 
there (Thuc. 1.105). The Corinthians hoped that this would draw the Athenians forces to 
Megara and away from Aegina (Thuc. 1.105). However these efforts failed when the 
Athenians raised a ragtag force of Megarians supported by Athenians who thwarted the 
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Corinthians’ push into the Geraneia Heights (Thuc. 1.105-6). Aegina fell to the Athenians 
in 457 BCE, who required the Aeginetans to remove their fortifications and hand-over 
their fleet (Thuc. 1.108; Diod. 11.78; Salmon 1997). 
          Following Aegina’s capitulation, in 456 BCE the Athenians sailed around the 
Peloponnese burning Spartan dockyards at Gytheum, they captured the Corinthian colony 
Chalcis (on the northern shore of the Gulf of Corinth), and attacked Corinth’s neighbor 
Sicyon (Thuc. 1.108; Kagan 1969). Not long afterwards the Athenians made use of the 
Megarian port at Pagae (on the Gulf of Corinth) to launch another attack on Sicyon 
(Thuc. 1.111). From Sicyon the Athenians took their Achaean allies to capture the 
Acarnanian town of Oeniadae but failed in the attempt (Thuc. 1.111). By 454 BCE, 
Sealey (1976) explains, the Athenians changed their policy by not launching any major 
operations in Greece for the next three years, and that the Five Years’ Truce in 451 BCE 
was, a continuation of this policy (272-3). Thucydides attributes the Five Years’ Truce to 
Athens trying to free up resources for her concurrent war against the Persians in Egypt 
and Cyprus from 460 – 449 BCE (Thuc. 1.112; Cawkwell 1997; Sealey 1976; Meiggs 
1979). However by 447 BCE Athens suffered a series of setbacks when Boeotia, Euboea, 
and Megara rebelled from the Athenian alliance (Thuc. 1.113). According to Thucydides 
(1.115) “Soon after they [the Athenians] had returned from Euboea the Athenians made a 
Thirty Years’ Truce with Sparta and her allies: Athens gave up Nisaea, Pagae, Troezen, 
and Achaea – all places which they had seized from the Peloponnesians.” Athens still 




The Archidamian War (431 – 421 BCE) 
          Just prior to 435 BCE the democratic faction at Epidamnus, a Corcyrean colony 
with a sizable number of Corinthian colonists, expelled the aristocrats ruling the city-state 
(Thuc. 1.24). These aristocrats linked up with Illyrian tribes (barbarians) in the area and 
started making raids on the city-state (Thuc. 1.24; Kagan 1969). Facing a serious threat, 
Epidamnus turned to her metropolis Corcyra for assistance both to ‘help make a 
settlement with the exiled party [the aristocrats] and to end the war with the foreigners’ 
(Thuc. 1.24; Diod. 12.30). But the Corcyreans refused to receive the Epidamnian 
ambassadors, thwarting their attempt to receive aid (Thuc. 1.24). Ultimately the 
Epidamnians found support in Corinth by claiming that their city was founded by a 
Corinthian (Thuc. 1.25). In essence the Epidamnians asked Corinth to become her 
metropolis in order to protect the city, and Corinth accepted.  
           Corinth sent more settlers and troops to Epidamnus, who traveled overland from 
the colony of Apollonia in order to avoid interference from the Corcyrean navy (Thuc. 
1.26). Once the Corcyreans learned what the Corinthians had done, they sent a naval 
force to Epidamnus demanding that they reinstate the exiled aristocratic party and expel 
the Corinthian troops and settlers (Thuc. 1.26). The Epidamnians refused, so the 
Corcyreans started to besiege the city (Thuc. 1.26). The Corinthians, supported by several 
allies, declared war on the Corcyreans and sent a naval force to relieve Epidamnus (Thuc. 
1.27–28). But the Corcyreans soundly defeated the Corinthians at the Battle of 
Leucimme, in 435 BCE, which was followed up by a Corcyrean offensive aimed against 
Corinth’s supporters like the Corinthian colony of Leucas and the Elean port at Cyllene 
(Thuc. 1.29-30; Diod. 12.31; Salmon 1997; Sealey 1976). In response Corinth began 
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building a more formidable navy (Diod. 12.32; Thuc. 1.31). Anticipating another 
Corinthian offensive, Corcyra established a defensive alliance with Athens in 433 BCE 
(Thuc. 1.44; Bury 1967). Corcyra’s envoys essentially argued that Athens should 
establish an alliance with them in order to avoid their navy falling into Corinthian hands. 
“Your aim, no doubt, should be, if possible, to prevent anyone else having a navy at all: 
the next best thing is to have on your side the strongest navy that there is” (Thuc. 1.35). 
Consequently Athens sent ten triremes (Ships) to reinforce Corcyra (Thuc. 1.45). 
According to Kagan (1969), “The Spartans had indicated their disapproval of the 
Corinthian policy; they had themselves stayed aloof and seem to have restrained their 
allies” (264). Nevertheless Corinth proceeded to attack Corcyra at the Battle of Sybota 
433 BCE, but this time only Megara and Elis supported the Corinthian endeavor (Thuc. 
1.46). The Battle of Sybota in 433 BCE was largely a draw; the Corinthians broke-off the 
engagement when they saw additional Athenian ships inbound to support the 10 triremes 
already present (Thuc. 1.50). Despite the fighting between the Athenians and Corinthians, 
the ‘Thirty Years’ Peace was still in force’ (Thuc. 1.53; 1.55).        
          Soon after in late 433 BCE, Athens ordered the Corinthian colony Potidaea, which 
was also a member of the Delian League, to stop receiving Corinthian magistrates and to 
remove the city’s fortifications (Thuc. 1.56). According to Thucydides (1.56) “these 
demands were made because Athens feared that, under the influence of Perdiccas 
[Macedonian King] and of the Corinthians, Potidaea might be induced to revolt and 
might draw into the revolt other allied cities in the Thracian area.” Perdiccas, once an 
Athenian ally, became a fierce enemy when he learned that Athens supported his brother 
and other rivals (Thuc.1.57). Perdiccas’ intentions became clear when he started to 
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communicate with his Chalcidian and Bottiaean neighbors to urge them to revolt against 
Athens (Thuc. 1.57). According to Cole (1974) “Perdiccas is aiming at the establishment 
of an anti-Athenian coalition in the north, which will eliminate all further possibility of 
encroachment in the Thermaic Gulf and ensure the integrity of Macedonia’s boundaries” 
(62). As tensions surged between Athens and Potidaea, the Potidaeans sent 
representatives not only to Athens and Sparta, but also to Corinth to promote her cause 
(Thuc. 1.58). Thucydides (1.58) writes that “Spartan authorities promised to invade 
Attica if the Athenians attacked Potidaea.” So the Potidaeans entered into an alliance with 
the Chalcidians and the Bottiaeans before revolting from Athens (Thuc. 1.58). The 
Athenians responded to the earlier Macedonian incitement by sending a contingent of 30 
Athenian ships with troops to quell any revolts in the northern Aegean (Thuc. 1.57). 
Upon arriving the Athenians discovered that Potidaea and others cities were already 
revolting, so they decided to concentrate their forces on their primary objective – 
Macedonia (Thuc. 1.59). Corinth sent a contingent of Corinthian volunteers and 
Peloponnesian mercenaries to Potidaea to bolster its defenses (Diod. 12.34; Thuc. 1.60). 
At this time the Macedonian king Perdiccas switched sides again, re-allying with Athens, 
which allowed Athens to concentrate all her efforts on the Potidaean revolt (Thuc. 1.61). 
(Macedonia flip-flopped alliances at least three times from the start of the Thracian revolt 
to the time Athens started blockading Potidaea [Thuc. 1.56-62]. During the entire course 
of the Peloponnesian War, Macedonia was known to be an unreliable ally, changing sides 
at least nine times [Hornblower 1983, 78; Errington 1990, 18].) Nevertheless, the 
Athenians and their reinforcements defeated the Corinthian contingent at the Battle of 
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Potidaea in 432 BCE, enabling them to besiege and blockade Potidaea (Thuc. 1.61-65; 
Diod.12.36).          
          The Athenian blockade of Potidaea induced Corinth to call upon Sparta to gather 
the Peloponnesian League members at the First Assembly to discuss whether the Thirty 
Years’ Peace of 446 BCE had been broken. The Spartans let their allies address the 
assembly so that their grievances could be brought out into the open. For an example, the 
Megarians asserted that the Megarian Decree, which barred them from using any port 
within the Athenian Empire, caused them significant economic hardship (See Below). 
But the Corinthians argued that the Athenians had been encroaching on their neighbors as 
well as other Spartan allies (Thuc. 1.69; 1.118). Corinth cited the Athenian interference in 
the dispute between Corinth and Corcyra (Thuc. 1.68). They further blamed the Spartans 
for not coming to Potidaea’s aid by invading Attica as they promised (Thuc. 1.58; 1.71). 
The Corinthians ended their speech with a threat, “Do not force the rest of us in despair to 
join a different alliance” (Thuc. 1.71). After listening to their allies, Thucydides writes 
“the Spartans voted that the treaty had been broken and that war should be declared” 
(1.88). The Spartans first consulted the Oracle at Delphi and then recalled her allies to the 
Second Assembly at Sparta to put the war to a vote (Thuc. 1.118-119). The Spartans once 
again allowed the allies to address the assembly to present their views. The Corinthian 
representatives made one last effort to persuade the Peloponnesian allies to vote in favor 
of war during the final speech, by urging the city-states that had not yet encountered 
Athenian encroachment living in the interior or away from major trading routes to 
support the ‘maritime powers’ to ensure that they would have an outlet to import and/or 
export their commercial goods (Thuc. 1.120). This suggests that further Athenian 
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expansion could reduce the maritime powers’ ability not only to trade in general but also 
to operate at all if Athens dominated the sea. They then explained that if Sparta’s allies 
hesitated and did not attack Athens while they had their chance, they would risk being 
dividing and conquered later.                   
‘If this was merely a question of boundary disputes between equals and affecting 
individual states separately, the situation would not be so serious; as it is, we have 
Athens to fight, and Athens is so much stronger than any single state in our 
alliance that she is capable of standing up to all of us together. So unless we go to 
war with her not only in full force but also with every city and every nationality 
inspired by the same purpose, she will find us divided and will easily subdue us.’ 
(Thuc. 1.122)   
 
Finally they declared that they would be justified going to war since they would be 
fighting to ‘liberate the Hellenes’ from the yoke of Athenian domination (Thuc. 1.124). 
Once the Spartans put the issue up to a vote ‘the majority voted for war,’ but they decided 
to delay attacking Athens in the short-term to finalize preparations (Thuc. 1.125). In the 
meantime both Sparta and Athens sent multiple envoys to see if either side would yield.   
          After Thebes attacked Plataea in 431 BCE all diplomatic exchanges between 
Athens and Sparta ceased. Thucydides (2.7) writes that Athens promptly sent embassies 
to areas surrounding the Peloponnese such as: Corcyra, Cephallenia, Acarnania, and 
Zacynthus to create new allies and strengthen their existing relationships. The Athenians 
then conducted raids on the Peloponnese and some of the Corinthian colonies in the 
Ionian Sea near Acarnania by capturing the city-states Sollium and Astacus as well as the 
four states on the island of Cephallenia: Paleans, Cranaeans, Samaeans, and Pronnaeans 
(Thuc. 2.30). Corinth successfully recovered Astacus a few months later only to lose it 
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again a few years later (Thuc. 2.33; 2.102). Clearly from the outset of the Archidamian 
War Athens applied pressure to Corinth and her allies in northwest Greece. 
          In the summer of 430 BCE, the Corinthian colony Ambracia along with its 
Chaonian allies stormed the nearby city Amphilochian Argos in Amphilochia (Thuc. 
2.68). (Amphilochian Argos was allied to both Acarnania and Athens [Thuc. 2.68].) The 
Ambraciots successfully gained control of the surrounding territory, but failed to take 
control of the city so they withdrew (Thuc. 2.68). Meanwhile the Athenian admiral 
Phormio, based in Naupactus, “instituted a blockade to prevent anyone entering or 
leaving Corinth and the Gulf of Crisa” (Thuc. 2.69; Diod. 12.47). Sparta also led a failed 
attack on the island of Zacynthus, whence the Athenian fleet launched raids into the 
Peloponnese (Thuc. 2.66; 2.80; Salmon 1997). During the summer of 429 BCE, the 
Ambraciots and the Chaonians convinced the Spartans to attack Acarnania by claiming 
that dislodging it from the Athenian alliance would weaken Athenian capabilities in the 
area and at the same time provide a jumping off point to assault Zacynthus and 
Cephallenia (Thuc. 2.80; Diod. 12.47). The Spartan commander, Cnemus, led a combine 
force of Corinthian allies made up of Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians as well as 
Chaonians and Peloponnesians (Thuc. 2.80). In addition, the Corinthian navy was 
supposed to support the land forces by conducting raids on the coast to draw the 
Acarnanian forces away from the interior where the army would strike (Thuc. 2.83). 
Cnemus proceeded to march his army into the interior away from the support of the 
Corinthian navy (Thuc. 2.80). However, He failed to take his objective of Stratus after 
several of his local Chaonian allies died trying to take the city (Thuc. 2.81; Diod. 12.47). 
So Cnemus and the remainder of the army retreated first to Oeniadae and eventually to 
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Leucas (Thuc. 2.84). At the same time the Athenian navy based in Naupactus sent a 
contingent of 20 ships to engage a Corinthian fleet almost twice its size (Thuc. 2.83-4; 
Diod. 12.48). The Athenians destroyed 12 ships before the rest of the Corinthians made 
their way to the Elian port of Cyllene (Thuc. 2.83-4). At Cyllene the Peloponnesians 
made repairs and acquired some more ships before setting out again to confront the 
Athenians (Thuc. 2.85). The Peloponnesians managed to capture several Athenian ships 
trapped along the coast while they were en-route back to Naupactus, which they left 
unguarded (Thuc. 2.90-1). But the Athenians re-engaged the Peloponnesians as they were 
celebrating causing them to panic and flee (Thuc. 2.92). The sea battle was ultimately a 
draw, but the Peloponnesians feared that Athenian reinforcements were on their way so 
they did not venture out to sea thereafter (Thuc. 2.92).      
          By the summer of 426 BCE, the Messenians in Naupactus felt increasingly 
threatened by the Aetolians living to the north of them (Thuc. 3.94). So they appealed to 
the Athenian general Demosthenes to carry out an expedition into Aetolia. According to 
Diodorus (12.60) “He then moved across to Aetolia and raided many villages there. The 
Aetolians, however, gathered their forces against him, and a battle took place in which 
the Athenians were defeated.” Even before the Aetolians defeated the Athenians, they 
sent envoys to Sparta and Corinth requesting that they provide assistance for an Aetolian 
offensive against Naupactus (Thuc. 3.100). Sparta dispatched 3,000 hoplites under the 
command of Eurylochus to plunder the area around Naupactus in Ozolian Locris, where 
they linked up with the Aetolians and other local allies. Salmon (1997) contends that it is 
likely that Corinth ‘provided a significant portion of the force’ even though Thucydides 
does not mention it (316). But the Spartans departed when they realized that they could 
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not capture Naupactus (Thuc. 3.102). The Ambraciots once again insisted that the 
Spartans should lead an invasion into Amphilochia and Acarnania (Thuc. 3.102). The 
Spartans made their way to the Aetolian city of Proschium near the border of Acarnania, 
where they waited while the Ambraciots mobilized their army (Thuc. 3.102).           
          That winter the Ambraciots invaded Amphilochia with their hoplites seizing the 
stronghold of Olpae (Thuc. 3.105). The Acarnanians reacted by sending a relief force to 
Amphilochian Argos and requesting Athenian aid and leadership (Thuc. 3.105). 
Meanwhile the Ambraciots in Olpae called for more reinforcements at home to 
strengthen their army before marching into Acarnania (Thuc. 3.105). Once the 
reinforcements arrived in Olpae, the Peloponnesians advanced into Acarnania from 
Proschium, Aetolia, only to find the majority of its inhabitants and army had gone to 
defend Amphilochian Argos (Thuc. 3.106). The Peloponnesians successfully joined 
forces with the Ambraciots at Olpae (Thuc. 106). Demosthenes arrived not long 
afterwards with 200 Messenian hoplites and 60 Athenian archers (Thuc. 1.107). The two 
sides remained at their positions for a few days, but when the two sides finally engaged 
one another the Athenians had the upper hand. The Athenians then proposed a secret deal 
with the Spartans to let them go free, while the rest of their allies would be left to the 
mercy of the Athenians and their allies (Thuc. 3.109). Thucydides writes that this was 
supposed to damage the Spartan’s reputation:       
Demosthenes’ aim was in part to weaken the army of the Ambraciots and their 
mercenary followers, but chiefly he wanted to bring the Spartans and the 
Peloponnesians into discredit with the Hellenes [Greeks] in these parts, as a 
people who put their own safety first and let down their allies. (Thuc. 3.109) 
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So many Ambraciots died in the confusion that followed, that their city could no longer 
muster any kind of defense. The Athenians pressed the Acarnanians to advance into 
Ambracia to conquer the region, but they declined (Thuc 3.113; Diod. 12.60). According 
to Diodorus (12.60) “At this point the Acarnanians – scared that if the Athenians got 
control of the city, they would become tougher neighbors than the Ambraciots – refused 
to follow them.” Instead the Acarnanians and Amphilochians concluded a Hundred 
Years’ Peace with the Ambraciots that ended the fighting between them (Thuc. 3.114; 
Diod 12.60).          
SUMMARY 
          Corinth did not directly drag Sparta into the Archidamian War by invading Athens 
or any other member of the Delian League, but took advantage of her prominence in the 
Peloponnesian League and the following conditions to entrap Sparta into declaring war 
against Athens to suit her own interests. Sparta’s dependence (DV2.1) on Corinth not 
only stemmed from her strategic location along the Isthmus of Corinth, but also her 
significant naval contribution to the Peloponnesian League. The Spartans knew that they 
could not afford to ignore Corinthian grievances for long, since Corinth was one of the 
major naval powers of the period. Corinth’s naval clout would have undoubtedly 
increased in the face of Aegina’s defeat during the First Peloponnesian War when Athens 
took possession of the Aeginetan navy (Thuc. 1.108; Diod. 11.78). The Corcyraeans 
enticed Athens to come to their aid by exploiting Athenian fears that the Corinthians, 
who possessed the third most powerful navy, could seize the Corcyraean fleet and 
thereby threaten Athenian ambitions (Thuc. 1.33; 1.35). Likewise, the two loyal 
Corinthian colonies Ambracia and Leucas provided ships to the Spartan side indicating 
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that Corinth was associated with three of the seven city-states providing Sparta with ships 
(Thuc. 2.9). In this case Corinth and Sparta shared the same strategic interests (DV2.3), 
as Snyder (1984) writes ‘keeping the ally’s power resources out of the opponent’s hands’ 
(472). It is not clear how much Corinth could influence her colonies in forming 
allegiances with Sparta or any other power should Corinth decide to defect. But Sparta 
clearly catered to Corinth and her colonies to ensure they had the forces necessary to 
meet any challenges posed by a great naval power like Athens. 
          Corinth’s behavior record (DV2.4) shows that she strived to maintain and widen 
her sphere of influence in northwestern Greece. Corinth settled colonies in the northwest 
to guarantee trade requirements for the city’s survival (Semple 1931). Although in later 
years Corinth struggled to remain the dominant power in the area when disputes arose 
between Corinth and Corcyra over who controlled the colonies settled by citizens of both 
city-states (Graham 1964). The Epidamnus dispute between Corinth and Corcyra can be 
viewed within this framework (Graham 1964). Corcyra’s assault on Epidamnus 
compelled Corinth to respond by sending its fleet and declaring war on Corcyra (Thuc. 
1.27-8). Corinth probably viewed Athens’ defensive alliance with Corcyra as further 
Athenian interference into her sphere of influence, a trajectory that Athens initiated by 
establishing Thurii, forming alliances with Rhegion and Leontini, and re-settling 
Messenians at Naupactus (Wick 1976), as well as reducing Aegina during the First 
Peloponnesian War.   
            Sparta showed her commitment (DV2.2) to support her allies by holding the First 
Assembly of 446 BCE, which determined that Athens violated the Thirty Years’ Peace 
treaty, though in reality Athens did not violate the Peace by allying herself to Corcyra, 
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since Corcyra was neutral and permitted to join whichever alliance she wished (Thuc. 
1.35). On the other hand, Corinth’s interference with Potidaea, who was already a 
member of the Delian League, clearly infringed on the treaty’s provisions. The Spartans 
further cemented their commitment to the allies during the Second Assembly of 446 BCE 
when the majority of her allies voted in favor for war. Athens remained steadfast in her 
conviction that the Thirty Years’ Peace had not been violated. Moreover, Athens insisted 
that Sparta should seek arbitration as the means to settle the international dispute as 
specified in the Thirty Years’ Peace (Thuc. 1.140; 1.144). But Sparta failed to submit the 
dispute to arbitration; thereby making an explicit commitment (DV2.2) to support her 
allies against Athens in wartime. Later on the Spartans acknowledged that they were 
primarily responsible for the Archidamian War: 
In the first war they thought that the fault had been more on their side, partly 
because the Thebans had entered Plataea in peace time and partly because, in spite 
of the provisions in the previous treaty that there should be no recourse to arms if 
arbitration were offered, they themselves has not accepted the Athenian offer of 
arbitration. (Thuc. 7.18) 
          These conditions enabled Corinth and her colonies, especially Ambracia, to entrap 
Sparta into carrying out military operations in the northwest that did little to advance 
Sparta’s strategic position in the war. The Ambraciots persuaded the Spartans to support 
their cause by arguing that if they could subdue the Acarnanians, they would be in a 
better position to capture the Zacynthus and Cephallenia islands from where the Athenian 
fleet launched raids into the Peloponnese (Thuc. 2.80; 2.66; 2.80; Diod. 12.47). In 
addition to the capturing the islands, Thucydides mentions that the Spartans thought that 
they could also use this opportunity to take Naupactus, the port from where the Athenians 
were attempting to confine the Corinthian fleet within the Gulf of Corinth (Thuc. 2.69; 
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2.80; Diod. 12.47). According to Kagan (1974) “Here is another of many instances when 
the Spartans were led into dangerous undertakings on behalf of their allies, and in this 
case the appeal was persuasive and the prospects seemed good” (107). However neither 
the islands nor the Athenian blockade operating out of Naupactus seriously threatened 
Sparta in the broader sense. Sparta would have been better served, focusing on objectives 
that reduced the Athenians’ ability to fight rather than concentrating on this campaign. 
The entire affair turned out to be a diversion courtesy of Sparta’s own allies.    
Section C: Megara 
          Megara occupies the northeast portion of the Isthmus of Corinth connecting the 
Peloponnese with central Greece. This strategic location enabled Megara to permit or 
deny invaders access to other regions of Greece. The topography of Megara further 
restricts troop movements, with the Geraneia Mountain range running along its southern 
border. Legon (1981) describes the Scironian Way through the Geraneia as “unlike the 
modern roads, which are cut into the mountainside at higher elevations, the ancient path 
narrowed here to a treacherous ledge” (34). Megara’s ally during the First Peloponnesian 
War (ca. 460-446), Athens, took advantage of Megara’s topography by guarding the 
Geraneia passes to prevent any Peloponnesian land forces from passing through the 
Isthmus of Corinth and reaching the Athenian territory of Attica (Thuc 1.107).  
           Megara took advantage of its geography by establishing a port on both its west and 
east coasts. The western port Pagae, on the Gulf of Corinth promoted, trade opportunities 
in the west resulting in the establishment of the Megara Hyblaea a colony in Sicily just 
north of Syracuse (Grant 1986). The eastern port Nisaea, on the Saronic Gulf, gave 
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Megara access to trade in the east where she established the colonies of Byzantium and 
Heraclea Pontica (now Eregli, Turkey) (Grant 1986; Semple 1931). Megara depended on 
these colonies to import grain supplies and other raw materials, since she lacked the 
agricultural ability to provide for herself she had poor soil quality (Semple 1931, 350). 
Megara balanced trade by importing grains and exporting manufactured goods (Semple 
1931; Hasebroek 1965; & Legon 1973). “The area of the Isthmus and the Saronic Gulf, 
including as it did Corinth, Sicyon, Megara, the Argolid, Aegina, and above all Athens, 
became one large manufacturing area” (Hasebroek 1965, 72).  
         Megara primarily competed with the other city-states in the surrounding region. 
Athens conducted a difficult land and sea war against the Megarians to control the island 
of Salamis in the Saronic Gulf circa 570 – 65 BCE (Plut. Sol. 12.3; Hornblower 1983; 
Botsford 1930). According to Adcock & Mosley (1975), in the sixth century BCE Athens 
secured the title to the island of Salamis claimed by both Megara and Aegina to improve 
her security, since Athens did not have a great deal of influence over her neighbors (23). 
After defeating the Megarians, the Athenian issued a decree to establish a cleruchy on 
Salamis clarifying the island’s tax and military obligations to the Athenians (Tod 1946, 
no 14; Fornara 1983, no 44). This incident increased Athens’ regional influence at the 
expense of Megara.  
The First Peloponnesian War (ca. 460 – 446 BCE) 
           Diodorus writes, “During the winter of 461 BCE a dispute arose between Corinth 
and Megara over some frontier land, and the two city-states went to war” (Diod. 11.79). 
Hornblower (1983) explains, “That the old quarrel between Corinth and Megara was 
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about borders; by the end of the archaic period Corinth had absorbed most of this frontier 
zone of good arable land” (96). Corinth’s population had been on the rise and needed the 
additional land to support its population (Hornblower 1983). As the war progressed the 
underpowered Megara contracted an alliance with Athens when it became clear that 
Sparta would not get involved in the dispute (Diod. 11.79; Thuc. 1.103). According to 
Kagan (1969) “She [Megara] must have known of Corinth’s special position in the 
Spartan alliance and that Sparta would surely side with Corinth” (25). At this point 
Megara became the ‘first city-state to abandon the Peloponnesian League’ (Cartledge 
2002, 193) 
          Athens immediately began securing the Isthmus of Corinth to protect Megara from 
the attacking Corinthians and the rest of the Peloponnesian League. Thucydides writes 
that “the Athenians held Megara and Pagae, and built for the Megarians their long walls 
from the city to Nisaea, garrisoning them with Athenian troops” (1.103).  This enabled 
the Athenians to re-supply Megara by sea using the port of Nisaea on the Saronic Gulf 
(Legon 1968). “It was chiefly because of this that the Corinthians began to conceive such 
a bitter hatred for Athens” (Thuc. 1.103). The Megarian alliance also gave Athens access 
to the Corinthian Gulf via the port of Pagae allowing Athens to sail directly to the city-
states in the west to trade and spread her influence (Sealey 1976; Bonner 1923). This 
would only provoke Corinth’s anger further, since Corinth established many city-states in 
western Greece as colonies and commercially dominated the area (Legon 1973). Corinth 
and her allies later planned to storm the fortifications in the Megarid to seize the Geraneia 
heights at the Battle of Megara 458 BCE, so that Athens would send reinforcements to 
Megara in order to relieve the Athenian siege on Aegina (Thuc. 1.105; Diod. 11.79.3). 
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But instead Athens mustered a ragtag group of old men and adolescent boys that forced 
the Corinthians to withdrawal after losing a series of engagements in the territory (Thuc. 
1.105).  
          Sparta largely stayed out of the conflict until the central Greek city-state Phocis 
invaded Doris in 457 BCE. The Spartan-led force decided to cross the Gulf of Corinth on 
boats to reach central Greece instead of crossing the Isthmus of Corinth on account of it 
being fortified by the Megarians and Athenians. Once the Spartans restored the Dorian 
towns, they were unable to return home by boat since the Athenians began operating a 
naval squadron in the Gulf of Corinth (Sealey 1976). At this point Thucydides (1.107) 
tells us that the Spartans decided to wait in Boeotia for a safe route home to develop. 
While waiting in Boeotia they began bolstering Thebes as the Boeotian hegemon 
(Justinus 3.6; Diod. 11.81). In addition the Spartans may have also started secret 
negotiations with members of the anti-democratic party in Athens to shake the foundation 
of the Athenian Democracy (Thuc. 1.107-8). These secret negotiations and actions in 
Boeotia threatened Athens, so the Athenians decided to take the offensive by engaging 
the Spartans in central Greece (Plant 1994; Thuc. 1.107-8). The Athenians marched into 
Boeotia where they confronted an amalgamation of Spartan and Boeotians troops at the 
Battle of Tanagra 457 BCE (Plat. Menex. 242; Plat. Alc. 1: 112C; Paus. 1.29.9). Reece 
(1950) argues that “the battle of Tanagra was entirely the result of an Athenian attempt to 
trap the Spartan expeditionary force, and that if left to themselves the Spartans would 
have gone straight home after dealing with the Phocians” (75). The Spartans and their 
allies narrowly won the battle. Afterwards “the Spartans then marched down into the 
Megarid and after cutting down some of the plantation trees, returned home through 
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Geraneia and past the Isthmus” (Thuc. 1.108). Demand (1982) suggests that the Spartans 
and Athenians may have negotiated a treaty after the Battle of Tanagra that would have 
allowed for the Spartan troops to return home unmolested, if the treaty did not bind the 
Athenians from pursuing the Boeotians (33). Ultimately the Megarian defection and the 
Athenian presence in the Isthmus of Corinth caused the Spartans hardships while trying 
to employ their military forces outside of the Peloponnese.       
          Euboea defected from Athens in 446 BCE compelling Athens to send troops to put 
down the insurrection. As Athens tried to bring order back to Euboea, Megara also 
defected destroying the Athenian garrisons with the help of Corinth, Sicyon, and 
Epidaurus (Thuc.1.114). At this time Megara also made an alliance with Sparta (Diod. 
12.5). The Athenians immediately put their Euboean expedition on hold and marched 
directly to Megara to plunder the territory (Diod. 12.5). Diodorus (12.5) writes, “When 
[the Megarians] emerged from Megara to defend their territory, a battle took place. The 
Athenians were victorious and pursued the Megarians back within their fortifications.” 
The Athenians went back to Euboea quelled the unrest and subjugated the island. The 
Spartans then invaded Attica and laid waste to the territory as far as Eleusis and Tharia, 
and then they returned to the Peloponnese (Thuc. 1.114; Diod.12.6). Thucydides writes, 
“Soon after they had returned from Euboea the Athenians made the Thirty Years’ Truce 
in 446 BCE with Sparta and her allies: Athens gave up all the places which they had 
seized from the Peloponnesians” (1.115). By the end of the First Peloponnesian War 
Athens lost influence in Boeotia and Megara. And although Athens maintained control of 
Euboea and Chalkis it was shaky. After the war all conquests were returned to their 
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original state at the start of the conflict with the exception of Aegina remaining a 
dominion of Athens. 
The Archidamian War (431 – 421 BCE) 
         In the years immediately preceding the Archidamian phase of the Peloponnesian 
war, Corinth had an ongoing dispute with her colony Corcyra over its settlement 
Epidamnus. Megara and several other allied city-states provided ships, money, and men 
to Corinth to confront the Corcyraeans. But after the Corinthians suffered a humiliating 
defeat at the Battle of Leucimme 435 BCE, Corinth began rebuilding her navy with the 
help of various allies (Diod. 12.32; Salmon 1997). Legon (1973) argues that Megara may 
have been helping Corinth acquire some of the necessary raw materials from the Aegean 
Sea to reconstruct its navy since Corcyra controlled the Ionian Sea from where Corinth 
normally acquired these materials (165-7). Megara also took part in the Battle of Sybota 
433 BCE when the Corinthians launched a second attack on Corcyra which resulted in a 
draw (Thuc. 1.46).   
         Not long after the Battle of Sybota 433 BCE, Athens instituted the Megarian 
Decree. The decree barred Megara from the Athenian Agora (Market) and all the other 
harbors within the Athenian Empire. “They [The Athenians] accused Megara of 
cultivating consecrated ground, of cultivating land that did not belong to them, and giving 
shelter to slaves who escaped from Athens” (Thuc. 1.139). However Kagan (2003) 
writes, “The true purpose of the Megarian Decree was as a moderate intensification of 
diplomatic pressure to help prevent the spread of the war to Corinth’s allies by ensuring 
Megara was punished for its behavior at Leucimne and Sybota” (39). However Legon 
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(1973) describes the decree as a means to prevent Megara from providing shipbuilding 
materials to Corinth and her allies (170). A writer from the era, Pseudo-Xenophon (a.k.a. 
Old Oligarch), describes how a naval power can weaken its adversaries by using 
embargoes to regulate what a state can import and export.  
Wealth they [the Athenians] alone of the Greeks and non-Greeks are capable of 
possessing. If some city is rich in ship-timber, where will it distribute it without 
the consent of the ruler of the sea? Again if some city is rich in iron, copper, or 
flax, where will it distribute it without the consent of the ruler of the sea? 
However, it is from these very things that I have my ships: timber, iron, copper, 
flax, and wax – each from a different place. In addition, they [The Athenians] will 
forbid export to wherever any of our enemies are, on pain of being unable to use 
the sea. (Ps. Xen. Const. Ath. 2. 11-12) 
          Due to Megara’s reliance on food imports, the effects of the Megarian Decree 
forcefully hit home with the population ‘slowly starving’ as indicated by Aristophanes’ 
play Acharnians (532-537). Bury (1967) writes “The decree spelt economic ruin to 
Megara, and Megara was an important member of the Peloponnesian league; the 
Athenian statesman knew how to strike” (394). Legon (1973) explains that the Athenian 
ability to disrupt Megarian trade would have had a ‘major impact on nearby 
Peloponnesian states’ (167). The spillover from the Megarian Decree would likely affect 
other members of the Peloponnesian League. Sparta as leader of the Peloponnesian 
League surely would have noticed the weakening of its league members.  
          The situation came to a head in 432 BCE when Corinth requested Sparta to 
assemble its allies to discuss war with Athens after the Corinthian colony Potidaea, a 
member of the Athenian Empire, defected and was under siege by Athens (Thuc. 1.66-
67). At Sparta’s First Assembly, the Megarian delegates argued that the Athenians were 
responsible for a number of grievances, but they insisted that the Athenians broken the 
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Thirty Years’ Peace of 446 BCE by implementing the Megarian Decree (Thuc. 1.67). 
After the Peloponnesians declared war at the Second Assembly, they sent embassies to 
Athens (432-1 BCE) giving them an ultimatum that if their grievances were not 
addressed there would be war. According to Thucydides “The chief point and the one that 
they [The Spartans] made most clear was that war could be avoided if Athens would 
revoke the Megarian Decree” (Thuc. 1.139). The leading Athenian citizen, Pericles, 
asserted that the Megarian Decree did not violate the Thirty Years Peace and that Sparta 
had ignored provisions within the treaty to settle interstate disputes peacefully through 
arbitration, which coincidentally violated a provision in the treaty (Thuc. 1.144; Thuc. 
1.140; Thuc. 7.18). The Athenians took Pericles’ advice not to give in to Spartan 
demands, but indicated their willingness to resolve any disputes peacefully through 
arbitration.   
          Megara suffered tremendously during the course of the war. Athens invaded 
Megara at least one to two times per year (Thuc. 2.31; Thuc. 4.66). And without the 
cessation of the Megarian Decree food shortages continued.  According to Legon (1968) 
“They were now almost entirely dependent upon overland importation of vital foodstuffs 
from Boeotia and Corinth” (214). In 427 BCE, the Athenians captured and fortified the 
island of Minoa in order to be closer to the port city Nisaea (Thuc 3.51). Legon (1981) 
explains that the forward location made it easier for the Athenians both, to monitor 
shipping and, to launch surprise attacks. The increased scrutiny on Megara’s port only 
intensified the population’s hardships. Thucydides (4.66) makes a vague reference that 
Megara had a revolution in which the democratic faction drove out the city’s oligarchic 
faction (Legon 1968, 214). Legon (1968) suggests that the Megarian revolution most 
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likely took place around 427 BCE, since Thucydides writes that the Spartans allowed 
‘political refugees from Megara’ to settle in Plataea after it was destroyed (Thuc. 3.68). 
Even though the democratic faction came out on top, Gomme (1956) suggests that these 
leaders were only ‘leaders of the popular party’ and that they did not ‘carry the majority 
with them’ (3:528). He adds that “the majority were not fanatical, and were more 
patriotic than loyal to the party, anxious to preserve their independence of both Athens 
and their Peloponnesian neighbours” (Gomme 1956, 3:528). Legon (1981) agrees “They 
[The Megarians] were still just as bitter against the Athenians” (238). The strong anti-
Athenian sentiment of the population and the democratic leaders’ narrow hold on power 
kept Megara from joining the democratic leaning Athenian alliance.   
          During the eighth year of the war 424 BCE, Megara decided to recall the oligarchic 
exiles now living around Pagae who were conducting acts of brigandage (Thuc. 4.66). 
According to Legon (1968) “This hostile force effectively cut Megara’s link with Boeotia 
and increased her isolation” (214). Megara hoped to prevent these exiles from plundering 
the countryside and strengthen their ability to continue fighting the Athenians. However 
leaders of the democratic party realized that they would probably lose public support 
once the oligarchic faction returned on account of Megara’s suffering population, so they 
decided to collude with Athenian generals to capture the port city of Nisaea and Megara 
by opening the city gates and allowing a mixture 600 Athenian and Plataean hoplites to 
enter the city (Thuc. 4.66-69). But when it came time to act the Megarians refused to 
open their city gates, so the Athenians focused their efforts on Nisaea instead. A Spartan 
force came to reinforce its garrison at Nisaea, but the garrison already surrendered giving 
Athens control of Nisaea (Thuc 4.69-72). A Theban force combined with the Spartan 
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force compelling the Athenians to retreat back to Nisaea (Thuc. 4.72-73). The Megarian 
oligarchs took advantage of the situation allowing the Spartans to enter the city, while the 
Megarian democrats fled (Thuc. 4.73-74).  
SUMMARY  
          Like Corinth, Megara did not chain-gang Sparta into the Archidamian War by 
invading Athens or any other member of the Delian League. Rather, Megara used her 
influence to pressure Sparta and the other allies into declaring war on Athens. Sparta 
depended (DV2.1) on Megara to allow her army to march across the Isthmus of Corinth 
to invade Attica. Megara also served as a major link in Sparta’s line of communication 
between her allies in Boeotia, Phocis, and Locris that she relied on to augment her forces. 
But most importantly Megara was one of the few city-states in the Peloponnesian League 
capable of supplying ships to Sparta.  These capabilities surely would have increased 
Megara’s value to Sparta and the rest of her allies. 
          Megara’s behavior record (DV2.4) reflected her willingness to defect from the 
Peloponnesian League in order to achieve her own goals. During the outbreak of the First 
Peloponnesian War, Megara defected when it became apparent that Sparta would not 
support her in the border dispute against Corinth. Instead Megara allied with Athens, who 
quickly seized the opportunity to take advantage of Megara’s port on the Corinthian Gulf, 
Pagae, to obtain more efficient access to the west (Thuc. 1.103). A position that Athens 
later used to launch sea attacks on Corinth’s neighbor Sicyon (Thuc.1.111). Athens also 
moved quickly to secure her position in the Megarid by fortifying the Geraneia Heights to 
prevent any unforeseen Peloponnesian intrusions. Blocking the Isthmus of Corinth 
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caused difficulties for Sparta when they tried to support Doris in central Greece. These 
actions highlight how much Megara had to offer either ally. Both Athens and Sparta 
strived to keep Megara in their alliance to maintain these strategic interests (DV2.3) for 
themselves and reduce them for their adversary. So when Megara pressed Sparta to act 
against Athens, Sparta had to respond. Especially after Corinth threatened Sparta that the 
allies would defect if she did not.         
          Sparta gave Megara the same explicit commitment (DV2.2) to fight as she gave 
Corinth (see above). Not long after the Battle of Sybota in 433 BCE, Athens started 
enforcing the Megarian Decree causing significant economic hardships for Megara 
(Thuc. 1.139; Aristoph. Ach. 532-537). Legon (1973) argues that the disruption from 
Megarian trade probably had a ‘major impact on nearby Peloponnesian states’ (167). This 
likely would have given Sparta the urgency to resolve the issue as quickly as possible. 
Sparta approached Athens with an ultimatum threatening war if Athens refused to address 
Aegina’s loss of independence, ending the siege in Potidaea, and ending the Megarian 
Decree. “But the chief point and the one that they [the Spartans] made most clear was 
that war could be avoided if Athens would revoke the Megarian Decree” (Thuc. 1.139). 
Athens rebuffed Sparta on these claims by stating that none of them violated the Thirty 
Years’ Peace (Thuc. 1.139; 1.144). In the end the Megarian Decree did not directly 
violate Thirty Years’ Peace, but it served as the Peloponnesian League’s best justification 
for declaring war on Athens.    
          Megarians exploited these conditions to entrap Sparta and the rest of the 
Peloponnesian League into declaring war on Athens to relieve their suffering. This laid 
the groundwork for Thebes to attack Plataea. But once the war was underway, Megara 
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did not attempt to entrap Sparta or any of the allies any further. Unlike the Corinthians, 
the Megarians appeared to be solely interested in the survival of their state. So Megara 


















  Chapter V 
The Athenian Allies 
 
Section A: Samos 
          Samos was a founding and prominent member of the Athenian led Delian League. 
The city-state, Samos, was located on an island measuring 28 miles (45 km) long and 
12.5 miles (20 km) wide in the Aegean Sea about 1.5 miles (2.4 km) from Asia Minor 
(Finley 1977, 179). Shipley (1987) adds “Its natural resources, too, which are plentiful in 
comparison with much of Greece, go some way towards explaining its ancient prosperity 
and power” (5-6). Strabo (14.1.15) writes “Samos is not altogether fortunate in regard to 
wines, but in all other respects it is a blest country, as is clear from the fact that it became 
an object of contention in war.” The island’s landscape consisted of forest covered 
mountains and plains more suitable to growing fruits and vegetables than cereals (Shipley 
1987, 6-8). Samos also possessed a natural harbor enabling it to develop a substantial 
maritime fleet used for trade and warfare (Thuc. 8.76).   
          Samian trade centered in the southern Aegean Sea, where Samos was able to take 
advantage of the natural sea and wind currents as well as her location to bolster her 
maritime commerce and take control of the sea using piracy (Shipley 1987, 11-12; Cook 
1963, 90). This allowed Samos to establish trade relations with city-states along Asia 
Minor including the Aegean islands of Korsiai, Icaria, Cyclades, Dodecanese, and 
Rhodes that eventually led to trade with the Levant and Egypt (Shipley 1987, 11-12). 
Conversely the city-state Miletus, located in nearby Asia Minor, became a major Samian 
trade rival with whom she competed for influence (Shipley 1987, 47; Hasebroek 1965, 
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97-8). The Samian navy reached its peak during the tyranny of Polycrates circa 525 BCE, 
who used it as a means to conquer and rule several islands in the region (Thuc. 1.13; 
3.104; Herod. 3.39). Polycrates also formed a relationship with Egypt in addition to using 
his navy to stave off Persian expansion in the region (Bury 1967, 233). However, 
Polycrates turned on his Egyptian friends by courting the Persians with whom he 
colluded to send 40 ships to attack Egypt (Herod. 3.44). Polycrates was captured and 
killed circa 523 BCE enabling the Samian aristocrats to take over the island’s 
governance. But the aristocrats failed to maintain Samos’ sea-power, which came to an 
end in 517 BCE (Burn 1962, 129). The Persians attacked and gained control of Samos by 
installing Polycrates’ exiled brother Syloson as its vassal ruler (Burn 1962, 129; Mitchell 
1975, 86-7; Herod. 3.139-142).         
          Miletus led the first Ionian Revolt against Persia in 499 BCE, in which Samos 
joined despite a long history of hostility between the two city-states (Shipley 1987, 107). 
The Ionian city-states even started to mint a common coinage to signify their ‘unity and 
determination’ in the revolt (Bury 1968, 243). But the Persians proceeded to chip away at 
the rebel coalition by attacking strategic rebel locations such as the Hellespont and the 
island of Cyprus (Herod. 5.103; 5.116). Capturing Cyprus gave the Persians’ Phoenician 
fleet the ability to freely move around in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. The turning 
point came in 494 BCE when the Phoenician fleet engaged the Ionian fleet near Lade 
Island in the vicinity of Miletus (Meiggs 1979, 29). Samos contributed 60 warships to the 
engagement but withdrew them at the last moment inducing others to do the same 
(Herod. 6.9; 6.14). Herodotus (6.14) records “The sight of the Samians under sail for 
home was too much for the Lesbians, who were next in line; they soon followed suit, as, 
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indeed did the majority of the Ionian fleet.” The Phoenicians defeated what remained of 
the Ionian fleet enabling the Persians to capture Miletus (Herod. 6.18-20).  
          After abandoning the Ionians at the Battle of Lade in 494 BCE, the Samians 
switched sides fighting alongside the Persians during the Persian Wars (Shipley 1987, 
108). A few Samians even earned Persian distinction at the Battle of Salamis 480 BCE 
when they captured some Greek ships (Herod. 8.85). However in the summer of 479 
BCE, Herodotus (9.90) writes that three Samian aristocrats assured the Greeks that if they 
sailed their fleet to Samos where the Persian fleet was harbored, the island would rise up 
in revolt. Persuaded by this proposal, the Greek fleet set out towards Samos. The 
Persians, weakened by their earlier defeat at Salamis, decided not to engage the Greeks 
and withdrew their forces across the Mycale Strait to Ionia (Herod. 9.96; Diod. 11.34). 
But in the meantime the Persians grew more suspicious and restricted the Samians from 
carrying their weapons, inciting the Samians to revolt which encouraged other Ionians to 
follow in the Samians’ lead (Herod. 9.99; 9.103).   
          The second Persian revolt in 479 BCE sparked a debate among Spartan and 
Athenians within the Greek alliance (also known as the Hellenic League), as to how they 
were going to protect the Ionians from the Persians in the long term. The Spartans leading 
the alliance proposed that the Ionians should be evacuated back to the Greek mainland 
(Herod. 9.106). However the Athenians argued that they should remain in Ionia and 
incorporated into the Hellenic League, to provide them with some security (Herod. 
9.106). According to Herodotus (9.106) “They brought into the confederacy the Samians, 
Chians, Lesbians, and other island peoples who had fought for Greece against the 
foreigner; oaths were sworn, and all these communities bound themselves to be loyal to 
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the common cause.” The new Ionian allies and the Athenians quickly took advantage of 
this added strength by claiming another victory over the Persians at the Battle of Sestos 
479 BCE at the Hellespont (Herod. 9.121; Thuc. 1.89). The Greek momentum continued 
until Spartan leadership of the alliance was put into jeopardy when a scandal revealing 
the Spartan general Pausanias’ fascination with Persian customs and traditions became 
known (Thuc. 1.95). The allies also strongly disliked Pausanias’s dictatorial leadership 
style (Thuc. 1.95). Several alliance members finally convinced Athens to take over 
leadership of the alliance in 477 BCE (Thuc.1.96; Meiggs 1979, 43). Thucydides (1.96) 
writes “Next the Athenians assessed the various contributions to be made for the war 
against Persia, and decided which states should furnish money and which states should 
send ships.” Athens placed the allies’ collected money into a treasury on the Island of 
Delos where the representatives of the alliance frequently met, giving rise to the 
‘Athenian alliance’ being referred to as the Delian League by modern scholars (Bury 
1967, 328).        
The First Peloponnesian War (ca. 460 – 446 BCE) 
          Samos fought alongside Athens as a member of the Delian League throughout the 
course of the First Peloponnesian War. The majority of Samian activity throughout the 
war can be ascertained indirectly, since the historical texts generally refer to the primary 
acting city-states and categorize the rest simply as ‘allies.’ For instance, Thucydides 
(1.104) documents that Athens sent a fleet with their allies to support the Egyptian revolt 
from Persia in 459 BCE. Meiggs (1972) suggests that a large number of Ionian ships, 
including Samian, participated in this endeavor since Athens was fighting on two-fronts 
and needed to take advantage of the extra manpower and resources (107). A marble stele 
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recovered from Samos reveals that a Samian captain captured 15 Phoenician ships at the 
Battle of Memphis in 459 BCE (Peel as cited in Meiggs & Lewis 1969, no. 34; Fornara 
1983, no. 77).    
          Thucydides (1.108) also describes how troops from Athens, Argos, and 
‘contingents from their other allies’ marched into Boeotia to confront an army of 
Spartans and Thebans at Battle of Tanagra in 457 BCE. But after the Spartan and Theban 
victory at the battle, the Spartans dedicated a gold shield to Olympia revealing that 
Ionians also fought at the battle. The Greek geographer, Pausanias, (5.10.4) writes “The 
temple has a golden shield; from Tanagra the Lacedaemonians and their allies dedicated 
it, A gift taken from the Argives, Athenians and Ionians, The tithe offered for victory in 
war." A marble epigraph discovered in Olympia corroborates Pausanias’ claim with some 
variations, such as the dialect (Meiggs & Lewis 1969, no. 36). This surely demonstrates 
that the Ionians took part in the battle and that Samian troops likely participated along 
with others from Chios and Lesbos.  
           By 454 BCE the Athenian expedition in Egypt turned into a disaster when the 
Athenian force succumbed to a siege on the island of Prosopitis after holding out for 18 
months (Thuc. 1.109; Shipley 1987, 111). (The Persians drained the channels 
surrounding the island to besiege it by land [Thuc. 1.109].) Not long afterwards, Plutarch 
tells us that Samian representatives proposed that the treasury for the Delian League 
should be transferred from Delos to Athens, which happened shortly thereafter (Plut. 
Arist. 25; Plut. Per. 12.1; Thuc. 1.96). Legon (1972) argues “this proposal could only 
have been made by a dedicated Athenian ally” (146). According to Legon (1972) 
“Athens’ recent debacle in Egypt revived fears of a Persian naval presence in the Aegean, 
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making the Delian treasury vulnerable” (146). This may reveal why there was little to no 
opposition mentioned by fellow alliance members. Of course, the alternative to this may 
simply be that Athens moved the Delian Treasury to Athens as her own power as the 
league’s hegemon grew. 
Samos Revolts (ca. 441 BCE) 
 By 441 BCE Samos and Miletus became embroiled in a conflict over who could 
take possession of Priene, which ended their six-year truce (Thuc. 1.115; Plut. Per. 25; 
Diod. 12.27). By this point Miletus was a tributary member of the Delian League, which 
put Miletus into the category of states contributing funds to the Delian League. Kagan 
(1969) explains that Athens stripped Miletus of its navy and forced it to become a 
democracy after losing the revolts in the 452/1 BCE and 446/5 BCE (98-101). Samos was 
still a non-tributary member that supplied troops and maintained its own navy to support 
the Delian League. This enabled Samos to keep a highly skilled military force intact, 
while Miletus’ military strength was increasingly neglected. According to Thucydides 
(1.115) “After having the worst of the fighting the Milesians came to Athens and lodged 
violent protest against the Samians.” Thucydides also claims that there were several 
private Samian citizens who wanted a democratic government instead of an oligarchy 
(Thuc. 1.115). Kagan (1969) writes, “apart from their preferences and advantage, the 
Athenians could not simply ignore a war between two members of their alliance, 
particularly if one was strong and the other weak” (170). However Plutarch (Per. 25) 
explains that Athens offered to arbitrate in the dispute between Samos and Miletus, but 
this was rejected. Quinn (1981) writes “A refusal to submit to Athenian arbitration was a 
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direct challenge to Athens and as such was a sufficient reason for her to act as she did” 
(11).  
          Athens responded by sending 40 triremes to Samos, setting up an Athenian 
garrison, and establishing a democracy (Thuc. 1.115). The Athenians also relocated 100 
Samian men and boys, as hostages, to the island of Lemnos before returning to Athens 
(Thuc. 1.115). Some of these hostages escaped to Asia Minor where they facilitated 
contact between, Pissuthnes, the Persian Governor of Sardis and the oligarchs remaining 
in Samos enabling them to form an alliance (Thuc. 1.115). At this point the Persians 
amassed 700 mercenaries and led them into Samos, where they imprisoned the Samian 
democrats, detained all Athenians on the island, rescued the Samian hostages on Lemnos, 
and made preparations to attack Miletus (Thuc. 1.115).  
          In the meantime Samos sought support from potential allies. Samos quickly 
approached Sparta, the hegemon of the Peloponnesian League, seeking assistance. The 
Spartans initially showed interest but decided against participating after their primary 
naval power, Corinth, vetoed the action at an alliance assembly (Thuc. 1.40). Kagan 
(1969) adds “It appears that there were also defections in Caria, Thrace, and the 
Chalcidice” (172). Thucydides (1.115) only mentions that “Byzantium joined them [The 
Samians] in revolting from Athens.” But Thucydides does not acknowledge any 
connection between the Samian and Byzantium revolts except that they occurred at the 
same time.  
          Once the Athenians learnt what happened, they dispatched 60 ships to Samos 
commanded by Pericles. Sixteen of these ships were diverted to Caria to observe the 
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Phoenician fleet while others travelled to Chios and Lesbos to bring reinforcements 
(Thuc. 1.116). The remaining 44 Athenian ships engaged 70 Samian ships near Tragia 
Island culminating in a Samian defeat (Thuc. 1.116). By this time 40 more Athenian 
ships arrived along with 25 ships from Chios and Lesbos (Thuc. 1.116). The Athenians 
then landed troops on Samos to make preparations to blockade Samos forcing her to 
surrender. After hearing rumors that the Phoenician fleet was on the move, Pericles took 
60 ships from the Athenian fleet and set out to Caunus and Caria to investigate (Thuc. 
1.116). The Samians took advantage of this moment to launch a surprise attack against 
the Athenians on both land and sea, and to regain control of the island for 14 days (Thuc. 
1.117). But when Pericles returned, he resumed the blockade that lasted until Samos 
surrendered almost nine months later (Thuc. 1.117). Thucydides (1.117) says the Samians 
“pulled down their walls, gave hostages, handed over their fleet, and agreed to pay 
reparations in instalments at regular intervals.” Four marble stele fragments found in 
Athens record the new oaths the Samians swore to the Athenians after their defeat 
(Meiggs & Lewis 1969, no 56; Fornara 1983, no 115). Fornara (1983) indicates that these 
inscriptions are incomplete but basically signify that the Samians swore that they ‘shall 
not rebel against the peoples of the Athenians either by word or deed or from the allies of 
the Athenians’ (no 115). Shipley (1987) argues that “the major effect of the Athenian 
War on Samos was to deprive it of an active role in allied naval and military expeditions, 
and any say in the use of the military resources of the allies” (117).  Essentially Samos 
came out of the revolt transformed into a tributary member of the Delian League, albeit 




The Archidamian War (431 – 421 BCE) 
          Samos remained a loyal Athenian ally within the Delian League all through the 
Archidamian War. Like the First Peloponnesian War, specific Samian actions in the 
Archidamian War are not acknowledged (see above). But the revolt of Lesbos in 428 
BCE made Athens suspicious that Chios and Samos would also revolt. Such concerns 
were not without merit, since a large number of exiled factions were operating in and 
around Chios and Samos, plotting to seize control of their respected city-states. The 
threat to Samos stemmed from a group of Samian exiles ensconced at Anaia located on 
the mainland across from Samos in Asia Minor (Thuc.4.75; Thuc. 3.32). Thucydides 
(4.75) writes “they [the Samian exiles in Anaia] helped the Peloponnesians by sending 
them pilots for their fleet, at the same time creating a state of disturbance in the city of 
Samos and welcoming all exiles from there.” This threat was realized in 428/7 BCE when 
the Athenians dispatched a fleet commanded by Lysicles to collect tribute from their 
allies (Thuc. 3.19). At one point Lysicles and his soldiers trekked from Myos, Caria, in a 
northwestern direction crossing the Maeander River when he and his soldiers were 
attacked and killed by Carians and the people of Anaia (Thuc. 3.19). Anaia and its 
inhabitants remained a nuisance for Athens throughout the Archidamian War.     
SUMMARY 
          Samos neither buck-passed nor abandoned the Delian League during the 
Archidamian War. This may be surprising since Samos’ behavior record (DV2.4) shows 
a long history of defecting when it mattered the most. Two Samian defections during the 
Ionian Revolt as well as the defection during the Persian Wars highlight how frequently 
Samos abandoned her allies. These defections often altered the course of the conflict. The 
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Samian defection at the Battle of Lade in 494 BCE encouraged other states to do 
likewise, including the Lesbian states, resulting in Miletus’ defeat at the battle (Herod. 
6.14). The revolt during the Persian War in 479 BCE sparked widespread Ionian revolts, 
which allowed the Hellenic League to capitalize on the activity by expanding its alliance 
into Persian held territories in the Aegean Sea (Herod. 9.103; 9.121; Thuc. 1.89). 
Moreover, the debate that following the revolt among the Hellenic League’s leadership 
showcased Athens’ explicit commitment (DV2.2) to the Ionians by championing their 
admission to the league and their intransigence when hearing the proposal of an Ionian 
evacuation to other areas of Greece (Herod. 9.106).     
            It is difficult to say whether Samos and Athens shared similar strategic interests 
(DV2.3) during the Persian Wars, since the Samians fought on the Persian side for the 
majority of the conflict. The Samian Admiral Theomestor even served with such 
distinction that the Persian King made him the tyrant of Samos (Herod. 8.85). But Samos 
seems to have changed sides when Persia’s weakness became clear after suffering from a 
series of defeats by the Greeks. This also could be the result of political expediency from 
domestic political factions rather than shared strategic interests. But by the time of the 
Egyptian debacle in the First Peloponnesian War, Persia’s resurgence aligned Samian and 
Athenian strategic interests (DV2.3) closer together. The potential Persian threat to the 
league’s treasury in Delos compelled Samos to recommend transferring it to Athens 
(Plut. Arist. 25; Legon 1972, 146). A move Legon interprets as coming from a ‘dedicated 
Athenian ally’ (1972). However, it is also worth mentioning that Samos (through Samian 
factions) entreated Persian support during the revolt of 441 BCE, after Samos tried to 
acquire Priene from her regional rival Miletus. Here Samos appears to be more concerned 
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with her own self-interests than the broader interests of the alliance and how these actions 
would affect Athens. 
         Athens’ dependence (DV2.1) on Samos gradually changed from the formation of 
the Delian League to the beginning of the Archidamian War. Originally Samos was a 
non-tributary member of the Delian League contributing ships (Thuc. 1.96). But after 
Athens put down the Samian revolt in 441 BCE, she became a tributary member of the 
league. From this point on, Samos would be required to hand over funds directly to 
Athens to help finance alliance activities. This also took away Samos’ ability to protect 
themselves from outside threats. But Shipley claims that Samos likely continued to 
provide Athens with rowers to man the Athenian ships (1987). This status change 
suggests that Athens’ dependence on Samos would decrease while on campaign or in the 
field. In other words Samian battlefield defections would have less impact on Athens and 
the entire alliance. Although failure to pay tribute to Athens would also cause hardship, 
but it would not immediately influence the outcome of a campaign or battle. This would 
mitigate the overall effects felt by the alliance and Athens brought on by the Samians’ 
opportunism.  
         The combination of these factors suggests that Samos would likely abandon Athens 
during the Archidamian War. Athens made an explicit commitment to the Ionians at the 
Hellenic League debate several years before the start of the Archidamian War. The 
strategic interests of the two states seem to be aligned for the most part but occasionally 
diverged when local self-interests and self-preservation dictated otherwise. Samos’ long 
history of defections and revolts prior to joining the Delian League suggests that this 
pattern of behavior would continue. But Samos played the part of a loyal ally all through 
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the early years of the Delian League. The Samian Revolt of 441 BCE required Athens to 
lessen her dependence on Samos by altering the alliance obligations between the two 
states to ensure that this type of disruption would not affect the stability of the alliance 
again. Snyder (1984) writes “If a state perceives its ally as less dependent, if the alliance 
commitment is vague, and if the ally’s recent behavior suggests doubtful loyalty, the state 
will fear abandonment” (475). Athens’ suspicions that Samos would abandon the Delian 
League became more evident after the Mytilene revolted in 428 BCE, prompting the 
Athenians to keep an even closer eye on the city-state. The possibility that exiled factions 
could install an unfriendly domestic government in Samos made Athens leery. But in the 
end Samos remained loyal to Athens throughout the course of the Archidamian War.  
Section B: Chios           
          Chios was another great co-founder of the Delian League.  Grant (1986) describes 
Chios as “A Greek Island, thirty miles long (from north to south) and from eight to 
fifteen miles broad, five miles from the coast of Ionia (western Asia Minor)” (165). 
Unlike Samos, Chios was known for its vineyards which produced ‘the best of wines’ 
(Strab. 14.1.15; Plin. Nat. 14.9). According to Plutarch (Mor. 470F), Socrates remarked 
that “Chian wine costs a mina, a purple robe three minae, a half-pint of honey five 
drachmas." Barron (1986) explains that this is an exaggeration that equates to nearly 
“three months’ wages” emphasizing the high quality of the wine found on Chios (95).            
         As an island city-state, Chios was naturally well suited for sea trade. According to 
Strabo (14.1.35) Chios had “a good port and with a naval station for eighty ships.” And 
Aristotle (Pol. 1291b) observed that a large portion of its population took part in sea 
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trade. Despite these advantages trade in the Aegean Sea was a fierce enterprise. 
Herodotus (1.165) even mentions that the Phocaeans requested to purchase the Oenussae 
islands from Chios, but the Chians refused to sell the islands because they were ‘afraid 
that they [Oenussae islands] might be turned into a new centre of trade’ which would 
compete with Chios itself. The majority of Phocaeans eventually settled in Corsica just 
off of the Italian peninsula (Herod. 1.165). Nevertheless Chios became well-known as a 
wealthy city-state in the 5
th
 century BCE (Quinn 1981).  
          Eventually Persia absorbed Chios into the Persian Empire like so many of the other 
Ionian states. However Chios joined the Milesian-led Ionian Revolt that erupted in 499 
BCE. And Chios distinguished herself at the Battle of Lade in 494 BCE, after Samos 
deserted the battle inspiring a large number of Lesbian and other Ionian city-states to do 
the same. The Chians remained loyal to Miletos and provided significant maritime 
resources to the fight against the Persians. Herodotus (6.15) explains that the Chians did 
not want to be known as ‘cowards,’ so they kept all of their 100 ships engaged in the 
battle refusing to withdraw. The Chians battled the Persian contingent of Phoenician 
ships by continuously charging into the ships creating havoc and allowing the Chians to 
capture ‘a number of enemy ships’ (Herod. 6.15). But by the end it was in all in vain as 
the Persian side won the day.  
          Chios joined the Hellenic League in 479 BCE after the Battle of Mycale along with 
Samos and Lesbos (Herod. 9.106). As mentioned above, the Athenians dissuaded the 
Spartans from attempting to relocate the Ionian population, including the Chians and 
Samians, back to Greece proper. Even though Athens led the attack during the Battle of 
Sestos in 479 BCE, Sparta remained the leader of the alliance (Herod. 9.121; Thuc. 1.89). 
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However, widespread allied discontent over Spartan leadership finally allowed Athens to 
take over the leadership of the alliance by 477 BCE (Thuc. 1.96). Chios became one of 
the Delian League’s co-founders and one of its most prominent non-tributary members 
(Thuc. 1.19).     
The First Peloponnesian War (ca. 460 – 446 BCE) 
          Chios fought alongside Athens as a member of the Delian League during the First 
Peloponnesian War. But like Samos, specific examples of Chian deeds throughout the 
conflict are not explicitly documented. As a maritime power, Chios, likely supported the 
Athenian fleet with troops and ships for the sea battle against the Corinthians near the 
island of Cecryphalia and the assault on Aegina (Thuc. 1.105; Diod. 11.78). In addition 
Chios probably assisted Athenians with their Egyptian campaign of 459 BCE (Thuc. 
1.104). However the most credible instance of Chian involvement in the First 
Peloponnesian War emerges from the Battle of Tanagra in 457 BCE when the 
Peloponnesians dedicate a victory trophy over the Athenians, Argives, and Ionians to a 
temple (Paus. 5.10.4). Even though there is no outright claim that the Chians were among 
the Ionians taking part in the battle, they were likely involved due to their importance to 
Athens and the rest of the Delian League.  
          Chios is better known for helping Athens put down the Samian revolt of 441 BCE. 
As mentioned above, the Athenians sent 16 ships to Chios and Lesbos to gather 
reinforcements should the need arise (Thuc. 1.116). The remaining Athenian ships 
commanded by Pericles defeated the Samian fleet off of the Island of Tragia. According 
to Thucydides (1.116) “Later they [Athenian fleet] were reinforced by forty ships from 
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Athens and twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos.” Athens utilized these additional forces 
to install a maritime blockade, and land troops on the island to take control of Samos. 
After being diverted for a short time elsewhere, Pericles returned to Samos where re-
established the blockade by adding 40 more ships from Athens and  30 more ships from 
Chios and Lesbos (Thuc. 1.117). The Samians capitulated nine months later.   
The Archidamian War (431 – 421 BCE) 
          Chios actively took part in the Archidamian War on the side of Athens and the 
Delian League. According to Thucydides (2.9) Chios primarily supplied Athens with 
ships. Fortunately the historical record describes several examples of how Chios 
supported Athens during the Archidamian War. In 430 BCE Pericles led a combined 
expedition of 100 Athenians ships filled with infantry and cavalry, augmented by 50 
ships from Chios and Lesbos, to conduct raids on the Peloponnese (Thuc. 2.56; 6.31). At 
first the combined force ravaged the countryside near Epidaurus and then they tried to 
take the city itself, but failed in the attempt (Thuc. 2.56). So they turned their attention to 
destroying the countryside near Troezen, Haliae, Hermione, and continued to raid the 
coast of the Peloponnese (Thuc. 2.56). From there the Athenian led force conducted an 
assault on Prasiae, a fortified area along the coast of Laconia (Thuc. 2.56). Afterwards 
they left the Peloponnese and returned to Attica.  
          The effects of the Mytilene Revolt in 428 BCE reverberated around the region. For 
instance the Peloponnesians sent a fleet under the command of Alcidas to support the 
revolt, which struck a great deal of fear in the Ionians since they lacked adequate 
fortifications to protect themselves from Peloponnesian raids (Thuc. 3.33). Quinn (1981) 
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suggests that this fear may have been the catalyst for Chios to build fortifications on the 
island, which may have been misconstrued by the Athenians as preparations for a revolt 
(41). According to Thucydides (4.51) by the winter of 425-4 BCE “the people of Chios 
also demolished their new fortifications as the result of pressure from the Athenians, who 
suspected them of contemplating a revolt.” But they did so only after receiving ‘the most 
reliable guarantees possible that Athens had no intention of altering the existing state of 
affairs in Chios’ (Thuc. 4.51).  
           The existence of a pro-Spartan faction probably gave rise to the suspicion that 
Chios would revolt. A marble stele found south of Sparta shows that the ‘friends of 
Sparta among the Chians,’ donated money to Sparta’s war effort sometime during the 
Archidamian War circa 427 BCE (Tod 1946, no. 62; Meiggs & Lewis 1969, no. 67). 
However, Quinn (1981) argues that the group did not have strong influence, since Chios 
did not follow Lesbos’ example by revolting (40). He also claims that when Alcidas, the 
Spartan fleet commander, captured and killed some Chian prisoners ‘there was no 
friendly understanding’ between the two city-states (Quinn 1981, 40). In fact Quinn 
(1981) speculates that the most influence that ‘the friends of Sparta among the Chians’ 
had on the Chian state was in 425 BCE when the Athenians ordered the dismantling of 
the Chian fortifications. But it seems unlikely that Chios would have revolted in 425 
BCE, since Chios supported Athenian activities at Pylos in 425 BCE by contributing four 
of the 50 ships that served as reinforcements from Zacynthus (Thuc. 4.13).             
          In 423 BCE the Spartans and Athenians just completed negotiating an armistice 
(Thuc. 4.119). The city Scione, located in Pallene, unaware that negotiations had ended 
began to revolt from the Delian League (Thuc. 4.120). The Spartan General, Brasidas, 
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who had been leading a mix force of Helots and Spartan mercenaries to encourage cities 
and towns in the region to defect from the Delian League, quickly came to Scione to offer 
his support (Thuc. 4.120). Not long afterwards another city in Pallene, Mende, also 
revolted from Athens and once again Brasidas pledged his support to city’s inhabitants 
(Thuc. 4.123). To stop the hemorrhaging of allies, Athens dispatched a force of 50 ships 
consisting of 10 ships from Chios to their destination at Scione and Mende (Thuc. 4.129). 
The Athenians managed to gain access into Mende and recovered the city (Thuc. 4.130). 
They then turned their focus to Scione where they established a blockade to besiege the 
city that lasted until 421 BCE (Thuc. 4.133; 5.32). Once the Athenians captured Scione 
Thucydides (5.32) writes “They put to death the men of military age, made slaves of the 
women and children, and gave the land to the Plataeans to live in.”  
SUMMARY 
          Chios failed to exhibit the behaviors associated with abandonment or buck-passing 
throughout the course of the Archidamian War. In fact the behavior record (DV2.4) of 
the Chians almost never veers from that of a steadfast ally from the time of the Persian 
Wars until the end of the Archidamian War. That is not saying that Chios never 
abandoned her allies; Chios joined the Milesian Revolt in 499 BCE abandoning the 
Persians. But once Chios joined the revolt she remained a dedicated ally. The Chian fleet 
even distinguished itself at the Battle of Lade in 494 BCE by not abandoning its allies 
unlike Samos, Lesbos, and several of the other Ionian allies (Herod. 6.15). In fact the 
Chians never considered revolting lightly; Thucydides (8.24) claims “they never ventured 
upon it [revolt] until they had many good allies ready to share the risk with them.”   
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         The alliance behavior coming from Chios remained consistent throughout the 
Archidamian War. Perhaps the Revolt of Mytilene in 428 BCE raised concerns in Athens 
as to whether Chios would also revolt. Immediately after the revolt, the Athenians held a 
debate to consider their response to the revolt and those responsible for it. At the debate 
the unofficial leader of the Assembly, Cleon, argued that Athens’ strength depended 
(DV2.1) on her allies to such a degree, that it was in Athens interests to crush the revolt 
in Mytilene and punish its inhabitants to deter other states from following in their 
example and weakening Athens further (Thuc. 3.39-40; Bury 1967, 416). At this point 
Chios was the only other non-tributary state besides the Lesbian states providing Athens 
with ships, so Athens likely felt extremely vulnerable. And this is reflected in Thucydides 
when he states that the new Chian fortifications led the Athenians to suspect that the 
Chians were planning to revolt (Thuc. 4.51). However, the Chians were easily dissuaded 
after Athens made an explicit commitment (DV2.2) that ‘Athens had no intention of 
altering the existing state of affairs in Chios’ (Thuc. 4.51). This new explicit commitment 
was more directed to the Chians than the earlier Athenian commitment made to the 
Ionians during the Persian Wars in 479 BCE (Herod. 9.106). This would have likely 
boosted the Chians’ confidence in Athens and eased the tensions between the two allies.   
          Chios and Athens probably still shared the same strategic interests (DV2.3) within 
the Aegean Sea. A Persian resurgence in the area would have threatened the interests of 
both Chios and Athens. Chios relied on Athens’ maritime support to keep Persia in check. 
Athens support was especially valuable considering Ionia was unfortified and vulnerable 
to sea raids (Thuc. 3.33). Even though Sparta was willing to haphazardly support revolts 
in the Aegean Sea, the Peloponnesians did not have the capability or desire to remain in 
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the area at that time. This would have likely opened the door for Revanchism on the part 
of Athens and Persia to regain territories in Ionia.      
Section C: Mytilene 
          The states of Lesbos became significant actors in the Aegean Sea. So much so that 
these states became involved with the Delian League at its onset as non-tributary allies to 
Athens. Grant (1986) describes Lesbos as “the largest of the Greek islands off the West 
(Aegean) coast of Asia Minor, at the entrance to the Gulf of Adramyttium (Edremid)” 
(342). This location allowed the Lesbian inhabitants to take advantage of its natural 
resources to conduct trade throughout the region. Grant (1986) writes “The fertile soil 
and favorable climate of the island sustained a Pentapolis (group of five cities) 
comprising Mytilene (SE) – which, although far the strongest, never completely 
dominated the others – Methymna, Eresus (SW, famous for its wheat), Antissa (NW), 
and Pyrrha” (342). Lesbos was well-known for its vineyards that produced high quality 
wines that had a sea-water flavor (Strab. 14.1.15; Plin. Nat. 14.9). On the island Mytilene 
developed a ‘substantial fleet’ and possessed an excellent natural harbor to house it 
(Legon 1968, 201). Strabo (13.2.2) writes “Mytilene has two harbors, of which the 
southern can be closed and holds only fifty triremes, but the northern is large and deep, 
and is sheltered by a mole.” These attributes allowed the Aeolian communities on the 
island to develop Mytilene into a significant actor in the Aegean.  
          Ultimately Persia came to dominate the whole of Lesbos sometime in the 6th 
century BCE along with the rest of the western portion of Asia Minor. By 499 BCE, 
some of the Lesbian city-states joined the Ionian Revolt led by Miletus. Lesbos as a 
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whole contributed 70 vessels to the Ionian side at the Battle of Lade in 494 BCE against 
the Persians (Herod. 6.8). But of course the Lesbians withdrew once the Samians 
abandoned the battle. (It is not known how many of these vessels came from Mytilene, 
but it is fair to say that it was a large portion.) According to Herodotus (6.14) “The sight 
of the Samians under sail for home was too much for the Lesbians, who were next in line; 
they soon followed suit, as, indeed did the majority of the Ionian fleet.”  This enabled the 
Phoenician fleet to defeat the Ionians fleet and the Persians to capture Miletus (Herod. 
6.18). Afterwards the Persian fleet captured Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos (Herod. 6.31).    
          Lesbos joined the Spartan-led Hellenic League in 479 BCE along with Samos and 
Chios (Herod. 9.106). Athens assigned Lesbos the status of a non-tributary ally (Thuc. 
1.19). This required Lesbian city-states to supply the Delian League with ships instead of 
money. The only mention of how many ships Athens required from a non-tributary ally 
comes from Mytilene in 428 BCE when it tried to abandon the alliance. According to 
Thucydides (3.3.4) “The ten triremes of Mytilene which happened to be serving with the 
fleet according to the provisions of the alliance were kept back by the Athenians and their 
crews placed under arrest.” Unfortunately this only refers to Mytilene and in the year 428 
BCE. So one cannot surmise the cumulative number of ships Athens required from the 
whole of Lesbos and how that number may have changed from year-to-year or given 
situation.  
The First Peloponnesian War (ca. 460 – 446 BCE) 
           The historical record fails to demonstrate how Mytilene participated in the First 
Peloponnesian War as a member of the Delian League. The only mention of Mytilene 
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from around this time period comes from the Samian Revolt in 441BCE. As mentioned 
above, Athens dispatched 16 ships to Chios and Lesbos to muster reinforcements as a 
precaution (Thuc. 1.116). When the time came Chios and Mytilene augmented the 
Athenian fleet with a total of 25 ships (Thuc. 1.116; Diod. 12.27). And later when the 
Athenians required more ships to blockade Samos, both Mytilene and Chios provided a 
total of 30 more ships (Thuc. 1.117; Diod. 12.28). It is not clear how many of these ships 
came from Mytilene, but she clearly supported Athens efforts in suppressing a revolting 
ally.            
The Archidamian War (431 – 421 BCE) 
         The earliest mention of Lesbos during the Archidamian War comes in 430 BCE 
when Pericles commanded a raiding expedition into the Peloponnese. Lesbos and Chios 
provided a total of 50 ships to the Athenian expedition (Thuc. 2.56; 6.31). Once again 
Thucydides does not specify if any of these Lesbian ships came from Mytilene. But the 
Athenian led expedition which concentrated its efforts on raiding the coast and ravaging 
the countryside along a route from Epidaurus, Troezen, Haliae, and Hermione (Thuc. 
2.56). Having been unsuccessful capturing any cities or fortifications the Athenians and 
the rest of their allies returned to Attica.  
          In the summer of 428 BCE “the island of Lesbos, except for Methymna, revolted 
from Athens” (Thuc. 3.2). Interestingly enough Thucydides (3.2; 3.13) writes that the 
Lesbians had been wanting to revolt for some time before the outbreak of the 
Archidamian War, but refrained from carrying it out since the Spartans would not accept 
them into their alliance. This is likely due to a provision made in the Thirty Years’ Truce 
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at the end of the First Peloponnesian War that stated that neither Athens nor Sparta could 
accept new members into their alliance from the other’s alliance (Thuc. 1.35). 
Nevertheless Thucydides writes that the Lesbians had been planning to revolt anyway 
and were in the midst of making preparations to do so. 
They were waiting until they had narrowed the mouths of their harbours and 
finished the fortifications and the shipbuilding which they had in hand; also for 
the arrival of various supplies which were due to come from Pontus – archers, 
corn, and other things that they had sent for. (Thuc. 3.2)  
Forewarned, the Athenians sent representatives to dissuade the Mytilenians from trying to 
unite all of Lesbos under their leadership and making military preparations, but they 
failed (Thuc. 3.3; Diod. 12.55). Alarmed, the Athenians quickly dispatched 40 ships to 
intervene in Lesbos before the preparations could be completed (Thuc. 3.3; Diod. 12.55). 
The Athenians planned on catching the Mytilenians off guard while they were distracted 
at a feast honoring Malean Apollo (Thuc. 3.3). Thucydides (3.3) writes that “If this 
planned worked, so much the better; if not, they were to order the people of Mytilene to 
surrender their ships and demolish their fortifications, and, if they failed to comply with 
these demands, to make war on them.” But the Lesbians discovered that the Athenians 
were on their way and ‘reinforced the unfinished parts of their walls, and their harbor, 
and stood on guard’ to wait for the Athenians to arrive (Thuc. 3.3).  
           Once the Athenians arrived it became clear that the Mytilenians had rebelled and 
so the Athenians ‘made war upon them’ (Thuc. 3.4). The Athenians also realized that 
they would not be able to handle the majority of Lesbos with the force they brought, so 
they made an armistice with the Lesbians (Thuc. 3.4). The Mytilenians used this time to 
send a delegation to Athens requesting the withdrawal of the Athenian fleet as well as try 
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to convince the Athenians that there was little threat of a revolution in Lesbos (Thuc. 
3.4).  In the meantime the Mytilenians also sent a delegation to Sparta requesting military 
assistance (Thuc. 3.4). Not surprisingly, the delegation sent to Athens failed to make 
progress and so ‘Mytilene and the rest of Lesbos, except for Methymna, went to war with 
Athens’ (Thuc. 3.5).  
          The Mytilenians first attacked an Athenian camp, but the Mytilenians lacked 
confidence to press on, and returned to their city (Thuc. 3.5). Afterwards the Mytilenians 
did not dare to venture back out before they received the anticipated military support 
from the Peloponnesians (Thuc. 3.5). The Athenians took advantage of this inactivity to 
build fortified camps on both sides of the city and to blockade the two harbors to deny 
access to the sea (Thuc. 3.6). By now, the Mytilenian delegation successfully persuaded 
the Spartans to accept them into their alliance (Thuc. 3.15). The Spartans vowed to 
invade Attica and to also send 40 ships to reinforce the Mytilenians in Lesbos (Thuc. 
3.15-16). At this point, the Mytilenians and a force of mercenaries went on the offensive 
against Methymna, the pro-Athenian hold out, but failed to take the city (Thuc. 3.18). 
Instead the Mytilenians withdrew to the Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus where they 
strengthened their defensive walls and increased their internal security before going back 
to Mytilene (Thuc. 3.18). Once the Mytilenians departed, a force from Methymna 
attacked Antissa and was soundly defeated by the Antissians (Thuc. 3.18). This event 
clarified to the Athenians that the Mytilenians controlled the majority of land on the 
island. Consequently the Athenians sent reinforcements to Lesbos under the command of 
Paches, who directed the building of a chain of fortifications to keep the Mytilenians 
trapped inside their city (Thuc. 3.18). According to Thucydides (3.18) “Mytilene was 
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now firmly blockaded both from the land and the sea, and winter was approaching.” 
From this point on Athens began to besiege Mytilene. Despite Athens’ attempts to seal 
off Mytilene from the outside world, that winter a Spartan named Salaethus managed to 
sneak into Mytilene to inform the magistrates that Sparta was going to invade Attica and 
that Sparta would also send forty ships to Lesbos to assist them (Thuc. 3.25). Thucydides 
(3.25) writes, “The Mytilenians were encouraged by this and became less inclined to try 
to make terms with Athens.”   
          When the summer of 427 BCE arrived the Peloponnesians invaded Attica as 
promised. The Peloponnesians wanted to create as much havoc as possible in Attica to 
hinder Athens’ ability to quell the revolt in Lesbos by making Athens fight on ‘two fronts 
at once’ (Thuc. 3.26). Thucydides (3.26) writes, “The invading forces destroyed 
everything that had started to grow up again in the districts which they had laid waste 
previously, and they went on to destroy such property as had been left untouched in 
earlier invasions.” At the same time the Peloponnesians sent 42 ships under the command 
of admiral Alcidas to provide assistance to the Mytilenians (Thuc. 3.26). But the 
Peloponnesian fleet wasted so much time on the way to Lesbos that the starving 
Mytilenians surrendered to the Athenians before the expeditionary force could arrive 
(Thuc. 3.27; 3.29). When the Peloponnesians heard what happened they considered 
making a surprise landing on Lesbos in the hope to catch the Athenians off guard, but 
Alcidas decided to hurry back to the Peloponnese as soon as possible in order not to risk 
losing the Peloponnesian fleet to the Athenians (Thuc. 3.30; 3.31; 3.33).  
          After Mytilene surrendered, the Athenians immediately condemned the male 
population to death and enslaved the women and children (Thuc. 3.36; Diod. 12.55). The 
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Athenians sent a single trireme to relay the message to Paches in Lesbos (Thuc. 3.36). 
However, the next day the assembly held another debate on the matter and reversed their 
decision. The debate basically centers on two arguments. The first, put forward by Cleon, 
asserted that the Athenians should stick to original resolution (Thuc. 3.36). He reasons 
that by destroying a revolting city-state, other city-states would be less inclined to revolt 
in the future (Thuc. 3.40). He explains that the process of putting down a revolt takes a 
long time, which drains vital resources and puts manpower at risk (Thuc. 3.39). In 
addition Cleon emphasizes the point, that “If our efforts are successful, we shall recover a 
city that is in ruins, and so lose the future revenues from it, on which our strength is 
based” (Thuc. 3.39). This fear was compounded with the worry that their other allies 
would revolt putting further strain on their resources while fighting both the 
Peloponnesians and their own allies at the same time (Thuc. 3.39). So to solve this 
problem, Cleon sought to deter other allies from revolting by destroying Lesbos and 
making it an ‘example’ to the rest of the allies (Thuc. 3.40; 3.44). However, Diodotus 
disputed the notion that destroying Lesbos would deter the other allies from revolting. He 
claims that if a state realizes that their revolt is on the path to failure, they will likely 
come to terms while they are ‘still capable of paying an indemnity and continuing to pay 
tribute afterwards’ (Thuc. 3.46). He goes on to say that by implementing Cleon’s method 
the city-state would ‘hold out against siege to the very end, since surrender early or late 
means just the same thing,’ their destruction (Thuc. 3.46). Eventually the Athenians 







          Mytilene clearly abandoned Athens and the Delian League during the Archidamian 
War. The majority of the indicators show that Mytilene had a natural inclination to 
abandon Athens. This should not be surprising given the general behavior record 
(DV2.4) of the Lesbian city-states from the period during the Persian Wars. The Lesbian 
city-states abandoned Persia to fight alongside of the Ionians during the Ionian Revolt of 
479 BCE. Then the Lesbian states once more abandoned the Ionians at the Battle of Lade 
in 494 BCE when the Samians left the engagement (Herod. 6.14). This allowed the 
Persians to defeat Miletos, which stifled the Ionian Revolt. Afterwards in 479 BCE the 
Lesbian states joined the Hellenic League, which later became the Delian League to fight 
the Persians (Herod. 9.106). One cannot determine whether Mytilene itself was involved 
in these revolts against Persia, since Herodotus does not mention Mytilene specifically. 
But one can imagine that Mytilene played a large role given her power and influence on 
Lesbos.  Mytilene even began to pursue options to defect from the Delian League before 
the Archidamian War, but Sparta denied her entry (Thuc. 3.2; 3.13).    
          The character of the Delian League changed as more states were reduced from non-
tributary to tributary status before the start of the Archidamian War. As the war 
approached only two Delian League members, Lesbos and Chios remained non-tributary 
allies (Thuc. 1.19; 2.9). The lower number of non-tributary states providing resources to 
Athens, likely increased Athens’ dependence (DV2.1) on the ships and contingents 
provided by Mytilene and the rest of Lesbos. Mytilene was known as a major force in the 
Aegean Sea due to its substantial navy (Legon 1968, 201). One cannot say exactly what 
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each of the city-state in Lesbos supplied Athens. But Athens likely depended on Mytilene 
for ships, rowers, as well as the location of its harbor. The only provisions explicitly 
mentioned by Thucydides (3.3.4) states that Mytilene had to supply ten triremes to serve 
with the Athenian fleet. However, during times of crisis Athens would likely call on these 
allies to reinforce her fleet. This happened in 441 BCE when Samos revolted; Athens 
requested and received reinforcements from Lesbos enabling Athens to subdue the revolt 
(Thuc. 1.116; 1.117; Diod. 12.27). The more Athens relied on Mytilene the greater the 
risk Mytilene posed to Athens if Mytilene decided to revolt from the alliance.    
          Athens and the rest of Lesbos both shared the same strategic interests (DV2.3) 
when fighting the Persians during the establishment of the Delian League. However this 
began to change as the Mytilenian envoy to Sparta alludes, “When we saw that they were 
becoming less and less antagonistic to Persia and more and more interested in enslaving 
their own allies, then we became frightened” (Thuc. 3.10). From this point on the envoy 
declares that ‘fear was the bond’ to keep Mytilene loyal to Athens (Thuc. 3.12). Fear, that 
Athens would reduce Mytilene into a tributary ally if Mytilene acted contrary to what 
Athens expected.  
          It also appears that Mytilene had become disillusioned with Athens’ leadership of 
the alliance and tried to severe her ties with Athens to join Sparta before the outbreak of 
the Archidamian War (Thuc. 3.2; 3.13). Even though Athens received word that the 
Mytilenians were preparing to revolt in 428 BCE, the Athenians were in denial and failed 
to act (Thuc. 3.2; 3.3). Athens did not even make Mytilene an explicit commitment 
(DV2.2) to ease the situation and bring Mytilene back into the fold. Instead the Athenians 
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tried to coerce Mytilene to conform and maintain the status quo. When this failed the 
























Chapter VI  
Conclusion            
 
 Recap           
          The goal of this thesis is to determine the significance of alliance pathologies in a 
bipolar international distribution of power. This tests the literature’s current prediction 
that alliance pathologies are not significant in bipolar systems. But it goes a step further 
by representing the first time that alliance pathologies have been studied in a bipolar 
system without nuclear weapons. This eliminates any possibility that nuclear weapons 
could influence alliance pathologies and clarify the true association between alliance 
pathologies and the bipolar distribution of power.   
           To carry this out I selected the bipolar system of Athens and Sparta during the 
Peloponnesian Wars to see if any alliance pathologies could found here that make a 
significant impact on their alliances. The case study itself examined the three most 
important allies from both Athens and Sparta. By investigating these six allies using the 
operationalized indicators provided in the literature review, I was able to determine not 
only when alliance pathologies occurred but also how they impacted their respective ally. 
This enabled me to analyze the observations against the hypotheses allowing me to 
determine the significance of the alliance pathologies in this bipolar distribution of 
power. And in turn help deepen the overall understanding of how alliance pathologies 
relate to the international distribution of power.      
          The rest of the chapter consists of analyzing the hypotheses against the 
Archidamian War observations made in the case study sections. Afterwards, I used these 
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analytic inferences to determine the significance of alliance pathologies in relation to the 
bipolar distribution of power. Finally, I applied this information to offer some foreign 
policy implications and suggest future research topics to advance the field of study.  
Analyzing the Hypotheses 
(H0) Alliance Pathologies are not significant in Bipolar Systems. Reject: 
          The null hypothesis, derived from the literature, proposes that alliance pathologies 
do not make a significant impact on alliances in bipolar systems (Christensen and Snyder 
1990; Snyder 1984; Waltz 1979). This stems from the notion that great powers in bipolar 
systems rely primarily on their own resources using internal balancing rather than 
alliances – external balancing (Waltz 1979; Christensen and Snyder 1990, 141-2). 
However, the observations made during this study show that the bipolar states, Athens 
and Sparta, relied heavily on their allies for specific advantages such as: geographic 
location, military capabilities, and raw materials as well as their other attributes. This 
reliance on external balancing made Athens and Sparta extremely vulnerable to alliance 
pathologies.  
          The two most noticeable examples of alliance pathologies causing the serious 
problems for Athens and Sparta during the Peloponnesian War include the Theban attack 
on Plataea in 431 BCE and the Mytilene Revolt in 428 BCE. Firstly, the Theban attack on 
Plataea in 431 BCE sparked the outbreak of the Archidamian War 431 – 421 BCE. This 
event clearly demonstrates that Thebes chain-ganged Sparta into a conflict against the 
Athenian before the Spartans wanted. Although the Spartans in concert with their allies 
previously declared war on the Athenians, the Spartans and their allies did not 
immediately take action against the Athenians. Instead the Spartans decided to postpone 
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invading Attica until they completed making all the necessary preparations. In addition 
the Spartans dispatched several diplomatic envoys to Athens to see whether or not war 
could be avoided.   
          However once Thebes attacked Plataea the diplomatic exchanges between Sparta 
and Athens stopped, forcing Sparta to request her allies to send their military forces to the 
Isthmus of Corinth to invade Attica. This Theban act clearly influenced Sparta’s 
behavior. But the question becomes what would Sparta have lost if Athens would have 
attacked or even taken control of Thebes? After all Sparta did not hesitate to abandon 
Thebes during the First Peloponnesian War at the Battle of Oenophyta in 457 BCE. What 
makes this episode different? Possibly the Spartans wanted to safeguard Thebes as a 
northern counterbalance to Athens’ growing power as described by Diodorus (11.81). Or 
perhaps the Megarian Decree already began causing food shortages in Megara, 
amplifying the value of Thebes and the rest of Boeotia to supply foodstuffs for Megara. 
What is clear, Sparta relied heavily on Thebes and the other city-states in central Greece 
to supply the Peloponnesian League with cavalry troops (Thuc. 2.9). Sparta likely 
allowed herself to be dragged into war by the Thebans to secure possession of these 
resources. But at the outset Sparta made the decision to support Thebes, a move that 
significantly impacted Sparta’s involvement in the Archidamian War.    
          Second, the Mytilene Revolt in 428 BCE in the midst of the Archidamian War 
shows how Athens regarded defections from her alliance. It is possible to observe the 
significance of this event through the Mytilene Debate in 427 BCE that followed the 
revolt, when the two Athenians Cleon and Diodotus debate the best whys to punish 
Mytilene to dissuade other allies from following in Mytilene’s footsteps. But Cleon and 
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Diodotus both agreed that Mytilene provided meaningful financial resources to Athens as 
well as other contributions (Thuc. 3.39; 3.47). It’s not made explicitly clear what these 
other contributions are, but it is likely that Athens relied on Mytilene for its ships, rowers, 
and harbor location as well as other factors. The potential permanent loss of these 
contributions likely drove Athens behavior in the way she sent a fleet to Mytilene to force 
the city-state back into the Athenian alliance. This would assure Athens would continue 
receiving these contributions. Not to mention stem the spread of defections from other 
allies in the Delian League.  
          Nevertheless, one can easily see that the Mytilene Revolt had a significant impact 
on Athens. Not only did it require Athens to devote time, manpower, and other resources 
to put down the revolt. But it also served as a distraction for the Athenians by taking their 
focus away from pursuing their adversaries in the Peloponnesian League. Therefore the 
revolt greatly influenced Athens and damaged her overall war effort at a critical moment 
in time.  
(HA1) Alliance Pathologies are significant in Non-Nuclear Bipolar Systems. Fail to 
Reject: 
          In addition to the two salient examples described above, there are other examples 
where alliance pathologies significantly affected the two great powers during the 
Archidamian War. But in order to eliminate the possibility of ‘false-negative’ reporting 
from the evidence indicating that both alliance pathology themes are not present when in 
fact they are, I will evaluate each of these pathologies using the sub-hypotheses. This will 




(HA1.a) Alliance Pathologies associated with Offensive/Defensive Advantage are 
significant in Non-Nuclear Bipolar Systems. Fail to Reject: 
Chain-Ganging: 
          The Theban attack on Plataea in 431 BCE (described above) represents the only 
instance of chain-ganging during Archidamian War. Sparta likely allowed herself to be 
dragged into the war because she needed the Theban cavalry and food resources to 
maintain the Peloponnesian military capability to fight Athens. The Spartans would have 
needed this military support since they had already declared war on Athens at the behest 
of their Peloponnesian allies. Losing a powerful ally like Thebes would have not been in 
Sparta’s interest.         
Buck-Passing: 
          No observable significance due to the lack of data. It may be possible to analyze 
the Athenian Tribute Lists to see whether or not the amount of tribute paid by allies 
varied considerably in relation to certain events. But, of course the more powerful allies I 
selected for this case study started off as non-tributary allies within the Delian League. So 
there should not be much information available for these states anyway. Another problem 
with the Tribute lists is that they are incomplete and full of lacunae as they did not 
survive well into modern times. Despite these issues scholars continue to study the 
Athenian Tribute Lists, so there may be possibilities in the future to study alliance 







 (HA1.b) Alliance Pathologies associated with the Alliance Dilemma are significant in 
Non-Nuclear Bipolar Systems. Fail to Reject: 
Entrapment: 
          Corinth and Megara both took advantage of their influence within the 
Peloponnesian League to pressure Sparta into declaring war on Athens during the 
meeting of the Second Assembly in Sparta sometime in 432/1 BCE (Thuc. 1.119). These 
states felt increasingly threatened by Athens ongoing encroachment into Corinth’s sphere 
of influence and the hardships caused by the Megarian Decree imposed by Athens. 
Sparta’s inaction and lack of involvement to resolve these issues resulted in Corinth 
threatening to abandon the Peloponnesian League if the Spartans failed to address these 
grievances (Thuc. 1.71).  
          The sections from the case study indicate how much Sparta needed to cater to 
Megara and Corinth in order to profit from their specific military advantages. Corinth and 
Megara both occupied strategic locations along the Isthmus of Corinth connecting the 
two halves of Greece, a vital piece of geography for an army dominant ally like Sparta. 
Not to mention Sparta would have likely remembered their difficulties crossing between 
central Greece and the Peloponnese during the First Peloponnesian War when Megara 
abandoned the Peloponnesian League. In addition, Sparta relied heavily on both Corinth 
and Megara to provide the Spartans and the Peloponnesian League with military ships. 
And Corinth held the distinction of possessing one of the most important navies of the 
period. All of these factors combine to give Sparta a pretty good reason to support these 
allies even though it really was not in Sparta’s interest to do so. Therefore the use of 
entrapment substantially influenced Sparta’s outlook and her engagement in the war 




          Mytilene represents the best example of a state abandoning either Athens or Sparta 
during the Archidamian War. The Mytilene defection caused great worry within Athens. 
The fear that a powerful ally like Mytilene could defect compelled the Athenians to act 
swiftly to quell the revolt and deter similar activities from other allies.    
Conclusion & Foreign Policy Implications 
          By examining the hypotheses one can see that once alliance pathologies 
materialized, they made a significant impact on the alliances led by Athens and Sparta 
throughout the Peloponnesian Wars. This indicates that the literature’s prediction that 
alliance pathologies do not make a significant impact on alliances in bipolar systems does 
not stand up to the evidence presented. But the results impart greater value by adding to 
our overall understanding of how alliance pathologies relate to the international 
distribution of power (namely bipolarity), and nuclear weapons. The evidence shows that 
alliance pathologies consistently agree to have made a significant impact on alliances in 
systems without nuclear weapons. However the significance of alliance pathologies 
consistently disagrees when the international distribution of power is considered – 
especially in bipolar systems. This suggests that nuclear weapons could have been 
responsible for the absence of substantial alliance pathologies in the bipolar system of the 
Cold War referred to in the literature. Figure 5, illustrates this consistency that nuclear 





          So what is it about this bipolar system without nuclear weapons that make alliance 
pathologies significant? After re-examining the case study it becomes clear that the two 
bipolar states, Athens and Sparta, depended heavily on their allies to provide them with 
certain types of military ‘technology and geography’ to enhance their warfighting 
capabilities. Athens indeed needed her allies to provide ships, manpower, and finances to 
conduct military operations and to ensure they received the necessary shipments after the 
Spartan army started invading the Athenian countryside, which denied Athens the ability 
to use its own resources and geography. The Mytilene Debate stresses how much Athens 
depended on her allies by acknowledging that their ‘strength was based on the revenues 
from their allies’ and that punishing Mytilene would ‘deter other allies from carrying out 
further revolts in the future’ (Thuc. 2.9; 3.39; 3.44). Likewise, Sparta depended on her 
allies Corinth and Megara to provide the Peloponnesian League with naval ships while 
Thebes and the rest of central Greece provided Sparta with cavalry forces (Thuc. 2.9). 
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The Spartan king Archidamus even urged the Spartans to delay rushing into war against 
the Athenians so that the Spartans would have enough time strengthen their ‘navy’ and 
‘cavalry’ forces which were inferior to those of Athens (Thuc. 1.80-81). More 
importantly Sparta had to satisfy Corinthian and Megarian wishes in order to ensure 
Sparta’s access to the Isthmus of Corinth that connected the Peloponnese to the rest of 
Greece. Without this valuable piece of real-estate the Spartans would have found it 
difficult to pursue any military objectives against the Athenians outside of the 
Peloponnese. The perception of these technological and geographic attributes shaped how 
the states and their leaders viewed the offensive/defensive advantage within the system. 
And the dependence of the two major powers to exploit and protect their allies’ 
technologic and geographic advantages compelled the two great powers to act in ways in 
which they may not have acted otherwise.    
          So why are bipolar systems with nuclear-weapons not significantly impacted by 
alliance pathologies? Unlike other types of great powers, nuclear powers with advanced 
delivery systems like Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) are not dependent on 
allies for their ‘technology and geography.’ This eliminates the need for nuclear powers 
to pursue allies in order to gain offensive/defensive advantages, which instead allows 
them to focus their attention on maintaining an effective nuclear deterrent. According to 
Waltz (1993) “No one has been able to figure out how to use strategic nuclear weapons 
other than for deterrence, nuclear weapons eliminate the thorny problems of estimating 
the present and future strengths of competing states and trying to anticipate their 
strategies” (73). This can be demonstrated using the brief synopsis of the 1962 Cuban 
Missile Crisis below.     
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          Not long after seizing power in Cuba, Fidel Castro announced his intention to put 
Cuba onto the path of socialism and started nationalizing the country’s businesses. This 
eventually led to the United States (U.S.) and Cuba to sever all foreign ties. As a result 
the Cubans turned to the Soviet Union to provide them with economic aid and a large 
array of military supplies including: tanks, artillery, fighter planes, and anti-aircraft guns 
(Khrushchev 1970, 491). Then after the failed U.S. invasion of Cuba in April of 1961 at 
the Bay of Pigs, the Soviet Union intensified their efforts to supply Cuba with military 
equipment. The Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev ultimately convinced a reluctant Fidel 
Castro to emplace nuclear weapons in Cuba to deter any future American invasions 
(Khrushchev 1974, 511). Since both the Soviet Union and Cuba thought that another U.S. 
invasion of Cuba was imminent, they agreed to emplace the R-12 (SS-4) Medium-Range 
Ballistic Missile (MRBM) and R-14 (SS-5) Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) 
in Cuba to deter any possibility that the United States would think about attacking Cuba 
in the future (Podvig 2004; Khrushchev 1970; Khrushchev 1974). 
          By this time the U.S. possessed not only the Atlas and Titan Inter-Continental 
Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), but also the Polaris Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile 
(SLBM), and the Jupiter Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM) stationed in the 
United Kingdom, Italy, and Turkey (Nash 1997; Podvig 2004). In addition to these 
missile systems, the United States Air Force had the Strategic Air Command (SAC), 
which was capable of delivering more than 2,000 nuclear weapons with over 1,200 
bombers to targets within the Soviet Union (Norris and Chochran 1997 cited by Podvig 
2004). The Soviet Union on the other hand possessed the R-7A (SS-6) and R-16 (SS-7) 
ICBM capable of reaching the United States, but in far fewer numbers (Nash 1997; 
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Podvig 2004). But by the end of 1962 the Soviet Union had about “100 Tu-95 and 60 3M 
bombers, which could deliver about 270 nuclear weapons on U.S. Territory” (Podvig 
2004, 4).    
          Nevertheless, once the Kennedy Administration learned that the Soviet Union was 
putting nuclear weapons in Cuba they assembled a team known as the Executive 
Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm) to discuss possible courses of 
actions to deal with the situation. President Kennedy was deeply concerned that “a 
miscalculation – a mistake in judgement” throughout the ordeal would lead to grave 
consequences (R. Kennedy 1969, 49). Robert Kennedy (1969) explains that President 
Kennedy’s ideas on ‘miscalculations’ were influenced by his reading of Barbara 
Tuchman’s book The Guns of August, which details the outbreak of the First World War 
(49). These, of course, are the same miscalculations that allowed ‘Cult of the Offensive’ 
to develop into alliance pathologies, which is what the literature describes as the main 
driver for the outbreak of the First World War (Waltz 1979; Waltz 1981; Posen 1984). 
Surprisingly these same notions of offensive advantage were circulating among the 
ExComm members throughout the Cuban missile crisis. General Curtis LeMay of The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), is known to have vigorously argued in favor of an ‘immediate 
military’ offensive against the Soviet missiles sites in Cuba before they became 
operational (R. Kennedy 1969, 28). Moreover when President Kennedy briefed the 
leaders of Congress on the situation, they ‘strongly advised military action’ stating that 
the blockade would be too weak of a response (R. Kennedy 1969, 42). But Robert 
Kennedy (1969) writes that when responding to the congressional members, “He 
[President Kennedy] reminded them that once an attack began our adversaries could 
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respond with a missile barrage from which many millions of American would be killed” 
(43). Clearly, President Kennedy was thinking more in terms of nuclear deterrence than 
offensive advantages. And it appears that Khrushchev was also thinking in terms of 
deterrence as well. He writes in his memoirs, “In our estimation the Americans were 
trying to frighten us, but they were no less scared than we were of atomic war” 
(Khrushchev 1970, 496). 
          Ultimately the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to withdraw their MRBM 
and IRBM nuclear weapons from their allies’ territories in exchange for assurances that 
neither of their allies would be invaded by the opposing bloc. It appears that neither the 
Soviet Union nor the United States were willing to be entrapped into a nuclear war over 
the interests of Cuba or Turkey. Of course, Cuba and Turkey were rather unhappy with 
this development. According to Khrushchev (1970) “Our relations with Cuba, on the 
other hand, took a sudden turn for the worse. Castro even stopped receiving our 
ambassador. It seemed that by removing our missiles we had suffered a moral defeat in 
the eyes of the Cubans” (500). And Turkey vehemently resisted the withdrawal of the 
missiles eighteen months prior to start of the Cuban Missile Crisis (R. Kennedy 1969, 
71).   
          The synopsis of the Cuban Missile Crisis shows that neither the United States nor 
the Soviet Union gained any technological or geographic value from Cuba or Turkey. 
Both the United States and the Soviet Union were already capable of destroying each 
other without the help of these allies. And even though there was some talk of exploiting 
offensive/defensive advantages throughout the crisis, this was subdued by the 
overarching role of nuclear deterrence by the primary decision makers.      
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        So what are the foreign policy implications? The threat of alliance pathologies will 
likely be less acute to states capable of providing for their own security – especially if 
they have a nuclear capability. Alliance pathologies themselves will likely continue to 
occur but with little concern to the nuclear powers. More research needs to be focused on 
predicting how nuclear states will react to alliance pathologies, so that we can make more 
reliable foreign policy recommendations to decision makers. But for now, policymakers 
and decision makers at the helm of nuclear states should exercise a policy of great 
restraint and caution when dealing with alliance pathologies – especially when they affect 
other nuclear powers. As nuclear powers may still be hassled from time to time by 
alliance pathologies in one form or another whether it is by buck-passing or 
abandonment. On the flipside nuclear powers could even become guilty of performing 
alliance pathologies themselves in the form of ‘nuclear abandonment’ by withdrawing 
their nuclear deterrent from areas where it provides security for non-nuclear allies 
(Snyder 1984).     
          Other states without the means to provide for their own security will likely 
continue to rely on external means, making them susceptible to alliance pathologies. This 
may even encourage some states to acquire nuclear weapons themselves if there are no 
alternative allies willing to provide them with support. But it is likely that the number of 
states possessing nuclear weapons will remain low as the international community 
continues to work to stem the spread of nuclear weapons. So the threat of alliance 
pathologies causing problems for these types of alliances will remain for the foreseeable 
future. But it is important to know what alliance pathologies are and how recognize them 
when they occur, so that steps can be taken to avoid the misadventures they cause. 
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Suggestions for Future Research 
          Future research needs to be invested into learning how nuclear weapons influence 
alliance pathologies and vice versa, so that scholars and policy-makers alike can make 
more reliable predictions on the topic. Glenn Snyder (1984) made some headway by 
focusing on how nuclear powers may conduct alliance pathologies themselves. But it still 
may be possible for alliance pathologies like buck-passing and abandonment to cause 
serious problems for their nuclear allies, especially if they are being denied crucial 
resources or strategic locations from their allies. These are some topics that may advance 
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